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INTRODUCTION
The avoidance doctrine instructs federal judges at all levels to avoid "unnecessary"
decisions of constitutional issues.' The Supreme Court created this doctrine as part of an
ongoing, self-monitoring effort to identify the appropriate scope of the federal judicial
power. The doctrine thus reflects the Court's predominant view of its own role in
formulating constitutional law: it does so merely as a byproduct of resolving concrete
disputes. However, in adopting this view, the Court minimizes its important function of
providing guidance on federal constitutional questions.
In this Article, I focus on a component of the avoidance doctrine which instructs
federal judges to decide constitutional issues, when necessary, as narrowly as possible.'
The Supreme Court in 1885 declared that federal courts should "never... formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
3
applied." I term this component of the avoidance doctrine the "rule of measured steps."'
This Article assesses what measured constitutional steps might entail and examines the
justifications for "narrow" constitutional rulings.
Part I of this Article introduces the complexity of identifying measured steps and
applying the rule. The justifications offered by the Supreme Court for measured rulings
provide a starting point. A ruling might be classified as measured because it promotes
deference to other constitutional interpreters, or because it results in only gradual change
in constitutional law, or advances a limited institutional role for the federal courts. But
any analysis of the rule of measured steps is incomplete if it ignores the various kinds of
measuredness furthered by a court decision. First, a ruling may be measured in that it
does not depart significantly from precedent. Second, measured steps might concern the
narrowness or breadth of a particular constitutional holding. A third aspect of measured
steps is whether a court's decision offers a flexible substantive legal standard which
entails discretion in implementation or a more rigid rule. Finally, the scope of relief a
court affords a constitutional violation could be measured or broad.
Part II then provides context by assessing the relationship between the rule of measured
steps and doctrines based on the case or controversy requirement. The rule of measured
steps (the "rule") is closely related to the justiciability requirement of standing. In fact,
the rule often serves as a supplement to prudential aspects of standing. The rule is based
explicitly on a theory of the federal courts' institutional role and the judicial duty to
construe narrowly the federal judicial power. I conclude that the best characterization of
the rule of measured steps is as a predecessor to the highly developed standing inquiry

1. In an earlier article, I identified seven components of the avoidance doctrine and then focused primarily on a
single component-the "last resort rule"-which obliges federal judges to avoid deciding any federal constitutional
question when a case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions,35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994).
2. As Gerald Gunther pointed out, this component of the avoidance doctrine "merely narrows the constitutional
ground of decision, but does not even avoid all constitutional decision." Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Vrtues"-A Comment on PrincipleandExpediency inJudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1964). In contrast, the
last resort rule
urges rulings on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible. Id.For a full analysis of the last resort rule,
see Kloppenberg, supra note 1.
3. Liverpool, N. Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (remanding the case
for a new trial and further factual development).
4. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, criticizing Roe v. Wade's breadth, recently commended "measured motions" in
constitutional and common law adjudication. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in aJudicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1198 (1992).
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that has emerged in recent decades. It nevertheless retains independent significance for
the Court: even when plaintiffs have established standing, the Court uses the rule of
measured steps to gauge how broadly or narrowly to frame a constitutional ruling.
Part III establishes the inconsistency in the Supreme Court's use (and neglect) of the
rule of measured steps. I found no clear patterns in the Court's application of the rule
during the last century and little explication of the rule. Part III focuses on Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services because it represents the case in which the Justices most
directly debate the meaning of the rule;' five members of the Court claimed to rely on the
rule of measured steps to avoid overruling Roe v. Wade., The five, however, disagreed
among themselves about the appropriate application of the rule and were attacked by
other Justices for irresponsible use of the rule. In dissent, Justice Scalia offered a flexible
approach for applying the rule of measured steps and argued that the Court should not
take a measured step in Webster. These varying approaches to the rule adopted by the
Justices in Webster show the difficulty of determining what constitutes a measured step
and the significance of disputes about the rule's application. Although the rule of
measured steps is often referred to as a straightforward maxim, Webster illustrates why
it is more accurate and useful to think of the rule as a collection of competing factors
which must be balanced on a case-by-case basis. The remaining sections illuminate these
factors by analyzing the costs and benefits of measured constitutional steps.
Part IV explores justifications for measured constitutional rulings and evaluates their
implications for the roles of the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and other
constitutional interpreters. First, measured constitutional rulings might promote deference
to other decisionmakers, thus encouraging them to participate more fully in the
development of constitutional law. Second, measured rulings might allow for more
gradual development in constitutional law by promoting laboratories for decisions in
many forums across the country. As an example, Part IV focuses on Webster to assess
whether it was a measured ruling that promoted deference and gradual development of
constitutional law. I conclude that Webster was a measured ruling in certain respects and
that it promoted a temporary kind of deference to other constitutional interpreters and
advanced at least one principle of gradualism. However, I also show that some would
classify these effects as disadvantages of measured steps and would reject application of
measured steps in the abortion context.
I argue that use of the rule of measured steps in Webster influenced the long-term
constitutional "dialogue" about abortion in several ways. First, the majority result in
Webster showed weak support for Roe but did not completely overrule Roe. It announced
no clear new constitutional principle to replace Roe. Rather, it signaled a directional shift
in constitutional law without formulating a rigid rule. Some other constitutional actors
thus perceived the Court in Webster as transferring to or sharing with them the power of
constitutional law development. Second, the measured result in Webster afforded time for
the Court to listen to the reaction to Webster before it decided future abortion cases.
Between Webster and the next landmark abortion ruling-which reaffirmed parts of
Roe-numerous constitutional actors voiced their views on abortion regulation; the
composition of the Justices changed; the vote of one Justice changed; and new litigation
provided further factual development of challenges to abortion regulation.

5.492 U.S. 490 (1989).
6.410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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But analyzing Webster also demonstrates the difficulty of weighing the competing
factors. The negative effects of gradualism and deference in the abortion context could
lead a jurist to find that the disadvantages of taking a measured step outweigh the
justifications for doing so. In Webster, the Court provided less clear guidance, leaving
the content of federal law ambiguous and less uniform. Justice Scalia argued that the
failure to directly overturn Roe by departing from the rule of measured steps retained the
status quo and did not recognize appropriately the power of the states. Others who
disagree with Scalia on the merits of abortion rights might also reject a measured
approach for the federal courts in that context. When federal courts are ambiguous, move
gradually, and defer too extensively to other constitutional actors, they fail to secure a
fundamental individual right. Thus, weighing the costs and benefits of measured steps
will depend on the substantive issue and a jurist's view of the merits of that issue.
Part V explores the disadvantages of measured steps, such as the failure of courts to
provide guidance when they avoid constitutional decisionmaking, as well as the
ambiguity and lack of uniformity in federal law resulting from some measured rulings.
In particular, when the Supreme Court refuses to fully address a constitutional issue, the
status quo remains intact; change is only incremental under the rule of measured steps.
A decision to take a measured step is not neutral-application of the rule is inextricably
linked to the substantive constitutional issue at stake. This Part considers harms resulting
to individual litigants and others by delayed resolution of constitutional controversies,
the instability engendered by certain approaches to the rule, and the inefficiencies the rule
poses for the courts and other constitutional actors. Specifically, this Part focuses on
recent litigation in the lower federal courts involving gays and lesbians in the military.
This litigation is useful to contrast the Supreme Court's use of the rule with that of the
lower federal courts, thus advancing consideration of differentiated uses of the rule at
various court levels. The Court's pronouncements sometimes serve a symbolic function
in our polity, and the effects of Supreme Court rulings can differ from those of other
courts. For example, the costs in terms of lessened guidance and uniformity for federal
law are sometimes greater when the Supreme Court fails to address an issue because of
the rule. Courts should heed those differences in employing the rule of measured steps.
I urge courts to consider explicitly the advantages and costs of taking a measured step
in each case. I argue that the Supreme Court (and in some circumstances, other courts)
should depart from the rule in certain contexts. This flexible analysis will enable courts
to balance their sometimes competing functions of providing'guidance on constitutional
questions and resolving particular disputes as narrowly as possible." And by explaining
the value choices they make in applying the rule, courts will advance a discussion of the
appropriate role of the courts in a dialogue about federal constitutional issues.

7. These two models roughly reflect two different functions of the courts: providing constitutional law guidance
and resolving particular disputes. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (describing the normarticulation function of courts); Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE LJ. 227, 238 (1972)
(describing the symbolic role of Court rulings in "shap[ing] people's vision of their Constitution and of themselves");
Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments,Preferencesfor Settlement, and the Role ofAdjudication at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1526-28 (1994) (considering tensions between the litigants'
interests and the public interest in court decisions); see also sources cited infra note 249.
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I. DEFINING THE RULE OF MEASURED STEPS
Formulating a definition of measured constitutional steps is complex. The justifications
occasionally referenced by the Supreme Court in support of measured constitutional
rulings provide a starting point.' Narrow rulings may give more deference to
administrative decisionmakers or other constitutional interpreters, thus promoting a
sharing of power.9 Courts may issue measured rulings when they have insufficient
information to consider the broader ramifications of a ruling. Measured constitutional
rulings are sometimes justified because more gradual changes in precedent allow for
stability and satisfy reliance expectations. 0 Measured rulings may also insulate the
federal judiciary from charges of inappropriate political activism." Thus, the judiciary
may use the rule to protect itself, relying on the countermajoritarian difficulty and
institutional competence arguments to transfer the responsibility for struggling with a
constitutional problem to the states, another federal branch, or other constitutional
decisionmakers. A ruling might be considered a measured step to the extent it advances
these types of justifications.
But that analysis is insufficient if it does not assess the varied aspects of measuredness.
A second axis by which to define measured rulings should include the kind of
measuredness furthered by a court decision. For example, a ruling might be classified as
measured if it does not depart significantly from precedent. But is a ruling measured if
it departs from current precedent in order to return to a preexisting constitutional
ruling-that is, does the direction of the change matter? Is a ruling measured if it purports
to preserve precedent but signals a large shift in the direction of constitutional law or the
2
type of protection the Constitution affords?
Whether a decision is a measured step also involves how narrowly or broadly a court
construes a constitutional provision. For example, a court could issue a ruling that is
consistent with precedent, but broad in its holding. Roe is often criticized due to its broad
4
3
holding, although it was consistent with earlier privacy rulings.1
A third aspect of measuredness is whether a court propounds a flexible legal standard
involving discretion in implementation or a more rigid rule requiring automatic
application. Thus, some might characterize Roe as a nonmeasured ruling both because the
Court articulated a broad principle and because the Court set out a relatively rigid
trimester scheme to apply that principle. In contrast, the Court arguably used a flexible
standard-the "undue burden" standard-when it announced a new constitutional

8. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991) (discussing rules as relationships to their

underlyingjustifications or summaries of underlying policy concerns).
9. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 756 (1978). This case is discussed infra part IV.A.
10. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1198.
11. Webster, 492 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
12. Parts II and TV consider whether Websterwas a measured step. Although the plurality claimed to preserve Roe,
the dissenters accused the majority of eviscerating Roe for all practical purposes. See infiu text accompanying notes 55-56.
13. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1198 (citing other commentators).
14. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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interpretation in Casey. 5 The lower federal courts and state courts construe the "undue
burden" standard as they apply it to new factual situations. In considering whether
Casey's flexible standard is a kind of measured step, however, we must also ask how
much discretion it affords other constitutional interpreters. The range of discretion may
be so limited that the choice left to others is illusory or insignificant.
The scope of relief afforded by a court ruling is another way to gauge measuredness.
A remedy may apply to a class of persons or only to an individual litigant. The ruling
may have a broad or narrow precedential effect. Implementation of the remedy may be
swift or deliberate. All of these factors are relevant to determining whether a ruling is
measured in its effect.
Defining measuredness is further complicated by the intersection of these various axes.
For example, did the Court take a measured step in Brown v. Board of Education?6 Most
people would probably characterize Brown as a departure from measured steps because
the Court overruled the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson.7 Brown, however, followed a
series of Court cases paving the way to its new precedent." Further, while Brown's
holding that separate public education facilities were inherently unequal could be
characterized as a broad rule, its implementation was narrow. When the Court refused to
order a fully effective remedy in the 1955 case, Brown v. Board ofEducation ("Brown
20
I/'), 9 the outcome of the decision in Brown became more measured.
Despite the difficulties in defining the rule of measured steps, the Court has spoken of
the general avoidance doctrine as an unquestioned mandate, part of a wise tradition
validated by time and experience. 2' In Webster, Justice O'Connor termed the rule one of
the fundamental rules of judicial restraint. 2 But the Court's own inconsistent approach
to the rule during the last century shows that the rule's application is not straightforward.
As a prudential technique, the rule is subject to flexible interpretation by each judge in
every lawsuit.' The rule of measured steps, like other avoidance techniques, appears
highly manipulable and sometimes appears to be used when a majority of the Justices find

15. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court. 1991
Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.22 (1992) (describing differences between
standards and rules in the Court's recent constitutional adjudication and assessing their implications for the Court's role);
see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982)
(discussing the life cycle of a rule over time).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
19. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For criticism of the Court's gradualist theory in Brown II, see Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness
as Property,106 HARv. L. REV. 1707, 1753 (1993). See also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW §16-20, at 1512 (2d ed.
1988).
20. I draw this example from a letter from Erwin Chemerinsky which greatly assisted me in defining the multiple
aspects of measured steps. Letter from Erwin Chemerinsky, Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern
California, to Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law (Mar. 26, 1995) (on
file with Author).
21. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 572 (1947).
22. Webster, 492 U.S. at 526. The Court frequently refers to the general avoidance doctrine as one of the fundamental
principles of constitutional adjudication. "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication
is unavoidable." Specter Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,105 (1944); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936).
23. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1027-35 (discussing the flexible implementation of the avoidance doctrine); see
PHILIP BoBBnTr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONsTrrIUnON 59-73 (1982) (discussing the prudential type

of constitutional argumentation, including avoidance techniques). This flexibility is similar to that used for rules of equity.
See DOUGLAS LAYcocK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INURY RULE 134-35 (1991). Laycock warns that the courts'
frequent recitations of the irreparable injury rule "help sustain the illusion that it is still a viable part of our law." Id at 99.
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the rule convenient to support their end.24 That result might be a conclusion on the merits
of a particular substantive constitutional issue; in contrast, it might be simply the result

of avoiding a decision, which retains the status quo and rejects (at least temporarily)
further development of constitutional law.'s
I conclude that the problem with the Court's application of the rule during the past
century is that the rule is often referenced as a given-as a rule of mechanical
application-without sufficient explanation of (1) whether a court has taken a truly
measured step and (2) the costs and benefits of the court's measuredness. I argue instead
for a flexible, context-dependent application of the rule of measured steps. For some,
flexibility may be valuable because it allows courts to sidestep "political" controversies. 2
In my view, flexibility in applying the rule is valuable because it allows courts to shift
27
between their sometimes competing public guidance and dispute resolution functions.
This Article offers no easy solutions to the difficulty of precisely defining what
constitutes a measured step, but these axes of measuredness provide a useful basis for
discussing what factors should be involved in applying the rule of measured steps.
Although the following Parts of this Article develop and examine these axes of
measuredness, it is important to remember the underlying definitional difficulty and the
multiple aspects of measuredness.

II. PLACING THE RULE OF MEASURED STEPS IN CONTEXT
Before examining the controversy among current Supreme Court Justices over the rule
of measured steps, it is helpful to consider the rule's link to the case and controversy
requirement and to separate it from similar doctrines of judicial restraint. The avoidance
2
doctrine lists seven ways in which judges should avoid deciding constitutional issues.

24. Like other self-imposed judicial restraint techniques, use ofthe rule leaves courts open to the charge that they
have implemented the rule in a manipulative, results-oriented manner. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Justiciabilityand Theories
ofJudicia Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S.CAL L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (1977); Susan Bandes, The Idea ofa Case,
42 STAN. L. REV. 227,229 (1990); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword.' Public LawLitigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1982); Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the BurgerCourt:
Saving the Communityfrom Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611,617-18 (1986).
25. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 534 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL,THE LEASDANGROUS BRANCH THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 118, 200-01 (1962) (noting
the effects of avoidance, including perceived legitimation of status quo); see also BOBBrrr, supra note 23, at 63-69;
Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1050-51. See generallyGunther,supranote 2. Cass Sunstein has eloquently demonstrated
how contemporary constitutional law in many respects treats the status quo as neutral in CASs R. SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTrmrON (1993).
26. See BICKEE, supranote 25, at 111-98 (discussing "The Passive Virtues"); BOBBrrT,supranote 23, at 59-73. But
see generallyGunther, supranote 2.
27. See infra part V for a discussion of these two models for adjudication.
28. The avoidance doctrine, as set out by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), consists of seven rules:
(1) "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, noh-adversasy,
proceeding... ",Id at 346.
(2) "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it."' Id (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commisioners 6f Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885)).
(3) "Te Court will not 'formulate a rule ofconstitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is to be applied.'" Id at 347 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co., 113 U.S. at 39).
(4) "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of." Id at 347.
(5) "The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that
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As I noted in an earlier article, some of the avoidance rules overlap entirely or in
significant measure with doctrines flowing from judicial interpretation of the case or
controversy requirement of Article III." These related doctrines include the justiciability
doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness, the political question doctrine, and the ban
on advisory opinions.3"
For example, the first rule of the avoidance doctrine-which requires an adversarial,
noncollusive dispute-overlaps with the ripeness and mootness requirements to ensure
that a controversy is "live" and in need of judicial resolution.3 The second component
of the avoidance doctrine mirrors the ripeness requirement by obliging federal courts to
refrain from deciding a dispute until it is ready for resolution.32 The first two rules of the
avoidance doctrine are alternative, but not distinctive, types ofjusticiability limitations
on the federal judicial power.33 They appear to function primarily as supplemental
versions of the ripeness and mootness requirements. 34
The third component of the avoidance doctrine is the rule of measured constitutional
steps. It correlates most closely to the justiciability requirement of standing, which
obliges a litigant to allege that she has personally suffered or imminently will suffer a
concrete injury fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and that the court's decision
will likely redress her injury.35 In requiring federal courts to rule no more broadly than
the precise facts require when they reach constitutional issues, the rule appears to reflect
the fact-specific focus of the standing inquiry. 6 The rule of measured constitutional steps
is based on concerns addressed by both the constitutional and prudential limitations of

he is injured by its operation." Id.
(6) "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits." Id at 348.
(7) If a "serious doubt" concerning the validity of an act of Congress is raised, the '"Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fhirly possible by which the question may be avoided."'
Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
29. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1011-27; see also
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA., 331 U.S. 549, 570-72
(1947); BICKEL, supranote 25, at 125; Gunther, supranote 2, at 13-17.
30. Rescue Army,331 U.S. at 570. The Court recognized that "often the line between applying the [avoidance] policy
or the [case or controversy] rule is very thin." Id.at 570-71.
31. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJJURISDICTION § 2.3.7, at110, § 2A.1, at113, § 2.5.1, at 125 (2d ed. 1994);
Bandes, supra note 24; Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability:The ErampleofMootness, 105 HARV. L. REv.
603 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication:The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973).

32. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); see Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article 111:
Perspectiveson the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV.L. REV. 297 (1979); Gene R. Niehol, Jr., Ripeness
andthe Constitution,54 U. Cmt. L. REV. 153 (1987); Jonathan D. Varat, VariableJusticiabilityand the Duke Power Case,
58 TEX. L. REV. 273 (1980).
33. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1018-20.
34. See Tsen Lee, supranote 31, at 654-68.
35. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968). For background on the standing doctrine, see Bandes, supranote 24;
Gene R. Nichol, Injuryandthe DisintegrationofArticle 111, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1915 (1986); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine
of Standingas an EssentialElement of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing andthe Privatizationof PublicLaw, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988).
36. Moreover, another rule of the avoidance doctrine requires that the plaintiff be injured by the challenged
legislation, and thus mirrors the injury and causation components of the standing inquiry. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at
1022. The doctrine of standing, like the avoidance doctrine, reflects "the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise
power only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity,' and only when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of separated
powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process."' Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)); see also David Logan, Standingto
Sue: A ProposedSeparationof PowersAnalysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37 (arguing that standing requirements are applied
more stringently to constitutional claims).
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standing and ripeness.3 7 The fifth component of the avoidance doctrine, which requires
that the challenged legislation injure the plaintiff," is closely linked to the concrete injury
and causation requirements of standing.
While standing purportedly centers on the qualification of litigants,39 the rule of
measured constitutional steps is more closely linked with third-party standing. The rule
sorts out the issues to be determined. The avoidance doctrine is based on separation of
powers and federalism principles, as well as on assertions about the delicate and final
nature of constitutional review, the judiciary's limitations, and the importance of
constitutional adjudication.40 Thus, the rule of measured steps emphasizes that courts
must carefully safeguard their own institutional role. The federal courts' competence is
limited in this essentialist view. 4' Indeed, Justice Brandeis familiarized the modern
judiciary with the avoidance doctrine in cases in which he was concerned about litigant
abuse of the federal courts' limited power, including collusive suits and requests for
advisory opinions. In an earlier article, I explored the historical context in which Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter, and then Professor Alexander Bickel, emphasized avdidance
techniques.4" They shared concerns about the countermajoritarian difficulty and
advocated a limited role for the federal courts in reviewing the acts of elected officials.43
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent construction of another component of the
avoidance doctrine, the last resort rule, arguably transferred some of this responsibility
for safeguarding the courts' power from judges to litigants.4 4 In contrast, the rule of
measured steps highlights the judicial duty to construe narrowly the federal judicial
power.
Thus, it is difficult to define precisely the relationship of the rule of measured steps to
other aspects of the case or controversy requirement. As mentioned in the Introduction,
the rule may be best characterized as a predecessor to the recently emerged, highly

37. Flast, 392 U.S. at 97 (discussing the unavoidable blending of constitutional and prudential considerations
underlying the avoidance doctrine). For a discussion of the prudential aspects of standing, see Kloppenberg, supranote
1, at 1022-23. Some suggest that the myriad applications ofjusticiability doctrines may be used to obfuscate decisions on
the merits. See Albert, supranote 24, at 1143 (stating that justiciability determinations reflect substantive decisions about
the actionability of claims); Bandes, supranote 24, at 229 (arguing that by using a private rights model, the Court fails
to sufficiently provide a role for federal courts in "safeguarding evolving constitutional values").
38. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,347 (1936).
39. "[Ihe "Tundamental aspect of standing" is that it focuses primarily on theparty seeking to get his complaint
before the federal court rather than "on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."' Allen, 468 U.S. at 791 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S.
at 99)); see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 124 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 571-75 (1947). In Kloppenberg, supra note 1, 1 argue
that the separation of powers and comity concerns are weightier than otherjustifications for the avoidance doctrine, at least
in the context of applying the last resort rule.
41. The theme of institutional competence and its link to legal process scholarship is explored by William N.
Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An HistoricalandCriticalIntroduction
tothe Legal Process,in HENRY M. HART,JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
42. loppenberg, supra note 1. Bobbitt notes that the Justices used the "passive virtues" more frequently once Bickel
told them what they were doing. BOBBrrT, supranote 23, at 232; see also Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Un-Coveringthe
TraditionofJewish "Dissimilation ":Frankfurter,Bickel, and Cover on JudicialReview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY
LJ.809 (tracing the doctrine ofjudicial restraint from Frankfurter and Bickel to Cover); sources cited infranote 88.
43. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1011-27.
44. Id at 1027-35 (discussing the Court's First Amendment ruling in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), reached by the Court because parties failed to "press" the nonconstitutional grounds for
discussion).
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developed standing inquiry.45 The rule serves as a supplement to prudential aspects of
standing, but it focuses on issues rather than parties. Nevertheless, the rule retains some
significance independent of the standing inquiry. Through use of the rule, some
constitutional issues that form part of a justiciable case or controversy are not decided for
prudential reasons. Even if a litigant has standing to bring a constitutional issue to federal
court, the rule affords the court discretion to issue a broader or narrower ruling; to rule
on one constitutional issue and avoid another; to depart to a greater or lesser extent from
precedent; and to issue a broad and speedy remedy or a narrow and gradual remedy.
Moreover, the Supreme Court sometimes speaks of the rule of measured steps as a
restraining principle that is independent of justiciability requirements. As shown below,
for example, the justiciability doctrines were not at issue in Webster, yet the Justices
fiercely debated the rule of measured steps. III. DISPUTE OVER THE RULE IN WEBSTER
In examining Supreme Court cases invoking the rule of measured steps from 1885 to
1995, I discerned no clear patterns in the Court's application of the rule other than
inconsistency. I found surprisingly little discussion of the rule, although dissenting
Justices often point out that the majority ignored the rule in order to issue an overly broad
decision." In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Justice Scalia provided the only
extensive analysis I found of the Court's prior use of the rule. Citing cases from 1803 to
1989, he argued persuasively that there has been significant inconsistency in the Court's
application of the rule and that it should be applied flexibly.
Thus, Webster demonstrates the Court's long-term inconsistency toward the rule. This
Part also evaluates Webster because it highlights, to date, the Justices' most pointed and
direct debate on the meaning of the rule of measured steps. Their varying approaches to
the rule highlight the difficulty of determining what constitutes a measured step and the
importance of disputes about the rule's application. For example, the Justices in the
plurality adopted a dispute-specific model which narrowed the value of precedent and
allowed easier departure from previous rulings.47 O'Connor, on the other hand, used the
rule to support her refusal to retreat completely from Roe or supplant Roe with a clear
new constitutional principle.4" Scalia advocated a flexible approach to the rule whereby
the Supreme Court could depart from measured steps when certain factors constituting
good cause exist.49
This disagreement underscores that the rule of measured steps has not and cannot be
applied mechanically with a simple reference to its traditional justifications. The Justices
fiercely debated the rule in Webster because of the rule's potential impact on the Court's

45. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky suggests that Brandeis' Ashwander formulation can be viewed as an early
statement of the justiciability doctrines. Letter from Erwin Chemerinsky, Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of

Southern California, to Lisa A.Kloppenberg, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law (Feb. 24,

1994) (on file with Author); see Albert, supra note 24, at 1144 n.21 (noting that the justiciability doctrines were not
"explored or elaborated" in 19th-century constitutional adjudication, but citing Liverpool, New York &Philadelphia S.S.
Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33 (1885), an early avoidance doctrine case).
46. Websterv. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 533; see also Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469-75 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,223 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,24674 (1983) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Scalia's measured steps discussion appears at Webster,492 U.S. at 532
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Webstr, 492 U.S. 490.
48. Id.at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
49. Id. at 533-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
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role in formulating constitutional law regarding abortion regulation. Webster shows why
application of the rule of measured steps cannot be separated from the context of the
substantive constitutional issue in a given case. It thus illustrates the need to approach the
rule as a collection of factors to balance on a case-by-case basis.
The Bush administration and the State of Missouri urged the Court to overrule Roe v.
Wade in the Webster case."0 A five-member majority of the Court upheld Missouri's
abortion statute, including its viability testing provision. Justice O'Connor concurred in
the Court's judgment, but refused to join the plurality's opinion to the extent it
"reexamine[d] the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade." 5 Apparently, her refusal to
join in a draft majority opinion circulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist attacking Roe was
instrumental in preventing the Court from expressly overturning Roe in Webster. 2 As
explained below, O'Connor relied on the second rule of the avoidance doctrine (mirroring
the ripeness inquiry) and the rule of measured constitutional steps to argue that the Court
should affirm the constitutionality of the Missouri statute without reaching the broader
53
constitutional issue of Roe's validity.
A. The Plurality'sApproach to the Rule in Webster
Both Justice O'Connor and the Justices in the plurality claimed to be abiding by the
rule of measured steps in Webster, but they disagreed on the methods of doing so. In its
cryptic Section III, the plurality applied the rule of measured steps and rejected the
invitation from Missouri and.the United States to overrule Roe because the "facts of the
present case... differ from those at issue in Roe." 4
Here, Missouri has determined that viability is the point at which its interest in potential
human life must be safeguarded. In Roe, on the other hand, the Texas statute
criminalized the performance of all abortions, except when the mother's life was at
stake. This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe, which
was that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived
from the Due Process Clause, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our
opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases. 55
With this emphasis, the plurality appeared to confine Roe's precedential value very
narrowly to its facts, claiming an ability to "modify" and "narrow" Roe without
disturbing its holding.
The plurality's approach to Roe and the rule of measured steps drew vehement criticism
from many quarters. The dissenters charged that the plurality used the rule to eviscerate
Roe while claiming to preserve it.56 The dissenters also accused the plurality of
manufacturing a controversy between the Missouri statute and Roe in order to needlessly

50. Id at 521 (plurality opinion); see Bany Friedman,DiaogueandJudicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 665-66

(1993).
51. Webster, 492 U.S. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
52. Benjamin Weiser &Bob Woodward, The MarshallFiles,WAsH. POST, May 23, 1993, at Al.

53. Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
54. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).

55. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

56. Id.
at 538 (Blaclanun, L,concurring in part and dissenting in part). Some commentators agreed. See Walter
Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion andthe Supreme Court: The RetreatFrom Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83
(1989); Michael C. Dorf, DictaandArticle 1I,142 U. PA.L. REV.1997,2007-09 (1994) (contending that judges can evade
precedents not otherwise distinguishable by viewing holdings very narrowly); Susan R.Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Abortion Politics: Writingforan Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989).
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address constitutional questions that were not actually presented.,7 Thus, the dissenters
directly contested the proposition that the plurality took a measured step in Webster. As
shown below, O'Connor and Scalia also disputed the plurality's approach to the rule of
measured steps.
B. Justice O'Connor'sApproach to the Rule in Webster
Justice O'Connor concurred with the plurality's judgment upholding the statute's
viability testing provision as constitutional." She refused to join in the plurality's
reasoning, however, arguing that the rule of measured steps did not require the plurality's
broad constitutional ruling. Because she found no conflict between the statutory
provision and precedent, she found no necessity "to reexamine the constitutional validity
of Roe." 9 O'Connor did not give any general theory about applying the rule of measured
steps, and she rejected Scalia's argument that compelling reasons existed in Webster to
depart from the rule. Instead, she responded that, although Missouri asked the Court to
overrule Roe, the Court could uphold the statute as Missouri interpreted it under existing
precedent. 0 She did suggest, however, that "[w]hen the constitutional invalidity of a
State's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there
will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully."" Thus, her application
of the rule led to a different result than the plurality's narrow confinement of Roe to its
precise facts.
O'Connor argued that the State has a compelling interest in determining whether if the
fetus is viable. By adopting the nonmandatory interpretation of the extremely costly
portions of the testing provision urged by Missouri and by emphasizing that plaintiffs did
not challenge the twenty-week presumption of viability on appeal, O'Connor confined
the potential constitutional dispute. 2 Her narrow interpretation of the meaning of the
viability testing provision was crucial to avoiding reconsideration of Roe and other

57. "The conflict between § 188.029 and Roe's trimester framework, which purportedly drives the plurality to
reconsider our past decisions, is a contrived conflict: the product of an aggressive misreading of the viability-testing
requirement and a needlessly wooden application of the Roe framework." Webster, 492 U.S. at 542 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. The Missouri statute provided that if a physician had reason to believe that a fetus was 20 or more weeks
gestational age, viability was to be determined by appropriate tests and exams according to a professional standard of care.
This essentially created a presumption of viability at 20 weeks, which the physician must rebut. The lower court construed
the testing as mandatory, whereas the plurality in Webster found it optional. The testing requirement was intended to
require "subsidiary findings as to viability," and therefore was consistent with the state's "important and legitimate"
interest in maternal health and potential life after viability. Webster. 492 U.S. at 514 (plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. O'Connor wrote:
The Court today has accepted the State's every interpretation of its abortion statute and has
upheld, under our existing precedents, every provision of that statute which is properly before
us. Precisely for this reason reconsideration of Roe falls not into any "good-cause exception"
to this "fundamental rule ofjudicial restraint .... "
Id. at 526 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 526-27. The dissenters, while rejecting her interpretation of the provision, agreed that her interpretation
of the testing provision could be reconciled with Roe. Id. at 543-46, (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

1996]

MEASURED CONSTITUTIONAL STEPS

precedent. 63 She thus preserved some part of Roe for reconstruing in a later case and
allowed time for further factual development in separate litigation.
C. Justice Scalia'sApproach to the Rule in Webster
Justice Scalia urged the Court in Webster to reach the validity of Roe, and termed
O'Connor's reliance on the avoidance doctrine in order to evade reconsideration of Roe
"irresponsible."" He argued that the doctrine did not apply because the Court could not
avoid deciding the constitutionality of the Missouri statute. 65 The only dispute, Scalia
maintained, was over the breadth of the constitutional ruling once the Court determined
it would reach the merits of the constitutional issue. 6" Justice O'Connor, as noted above,
agreed that some constitutional ruling was necessary, but urged a narrow ruling, relying
in part on the rule of measured steps.
Scalia argued that the rule of measured constitutional steps "is a sound general
principle, but one often departed from when good reason exists."67 He characterized the
rule as having a "frequently applied good-cause exception" and criticized the Court for
venerating the rule in Webster to avoid overruling Roe, which he viewed as a paradigm
of broad constitutional decisionmaking." Scalia provided numerous examples of cases
in which the Court departed from the rule, spanning from Marbury v. Madison to the
1989 term. 69 He noted that "[t]he Court has often spoken more broadly than needed in
precisely the fashion at issue here, announcing a new rule of constitutional law when it

63. To establish where O'Connor diverged from the plurality on applying the rule ofmeasured steps in Webster, it
is helpful to separate her discussion of the viability testing provision into two parts. First, she agreed with the plurality's
interpretation of the testing requirement: "[lIt does nothing more than delineate means by which the unchallenged 20-week
presumption of viability may be overcome if those means are useful in doing so and can be prudently employed." Id at
527 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This interpretation differed from how the court of
appeals and the dissenting Justices read the testing requirement. Indeed, the dissenters found the interpretation adopted
by the plurality and O'Connor was implausible; they simply found no ambiguity in the provision. Id.at 542-46 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They read the provision as a mandate to perform tests to find gestational age,
fetal weight, and lung maturity, even if a doctor deemed such testing imprudent. Second, although O'Connor and the
plurality agreed on a nonmandatory interpretation of the viability testing provision, she could reconcile that interpretation
with existing precedent. Id at 526-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concunrring in the judgment). She reasoned that
precedent recognized a state's interest in promoting potential life when viability is possible. The statute's 20-week
presumption of viability was not challenged on appeal. Thus, she concluded that requiring tests "useful to determining
whether a fetus is viable, when viability is possible, and when [testing] would not be medically imprudent" was
constitutional. Id at 530.
64. Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. As Gerald Gunther explained, when the Court relies on the rule of measured steps, "it merely narrows the
constitutional ground of decision, but does not even avoid all constitutional decision." Gunther, supranote 2, at 16.
66. "We ... could not avoid deciding, whether the Missouri statute meets the requirements of the United States
Constitution. The only choice available is whether, in deciding the constitutional question, we should use Roe v. Wade
as the benchmark, or something else." Webster,492 U.S. at 532-33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
67. Id at 533.
68. Scalia wrote:
It would be wrong ... to ignore the reality that our policy not to "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts" has a frequently applied good-eause exception. But it seems particularly perverse
to convert the policy into an absolute in the present case, in order to place beyond reach the inexpressibly "broaderthan-was-required-by-the-precise-facts" structure established by Roe v. Wade.
Id. at 534.
69. Scalia noted:
I have not identified with certainty the first instance of our deciding a case on broader constitutional grounds than
absolutely necessary, but it is assuredly no later than Marburyv. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), where we held that
mandamus could constitutionally issue against the Secretary of State, although that was unnecessary given our
holding that the law authorizing issuance of the mandamus by the Court was unconstitutional.
Webster.492 U.S. at 533 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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could have reached the identical result by applying the rule thereby displaced. 7 Scalia
continued: "It is rare, of course, that the Court goes out of its way to acknowledge that
its judgment could have been reached under the old constitutional rule, making its
adoption of the new one unnecessary to the decision, but even such explicit
acknowledgment is not unheard of."' 7' He concluded that it is difficult or impossible to
name all the cases when the Court has ruled more broadly than necessary.
The task of evaluating the Court's use of the rule of measured steps is complicated
because there is likely to be substantial disagreement in coming up with a list of overly
broad or "unnecessary" rulings, in part due to the definitional problems discussed in Part
I2 Scalia demonstrates persuasively, however, that the Supreme Court has not used it in
a consistent and coherent manner. The Court, at least in practice, has refused to "never
...formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied."" Instead, there is considerable flexibility in the Court's
application of the rule, although standards remain unarticulated. This Article urges courts
to develop definitions of measuredness and assess how they apply the rule, balancing its
competing concerns, in light of the proper role of the federal courts.
Scalia, in considering whether to apply the rule of measured steps in Webster, asked
"whether there are valid reasons to go beyond the most stingy possible holding today."74
He advocated a flexible approach toward the rule which requires jurists to examine
whether it is appropriate to issue a broad or measured constitutional ruling on a case-bycase basis. Using specific factors, he concluded that "valid and compelling" reasons for
departure from the rule existed in Webster.7" Part IV.B examines the factors offered by
Scalia for applying his flexible approach to the rule.
D. Other Avoidance Techniques in Webster
The rule of measured steps was not the only technique used to avoid constitutional
adjudication in Webster. The Court found nonjusticiable a challenge to the statute's
preamble, which provided that life begins at conception.76 The Court also found moot the

70. Id.At the start of his opinion, Sealia says the viability testing provision cannot be reconciled with Roe, id at 532,
but later he says that the question whether the provision "contravened this Court's understanding of Roe" is arguable. Id.
at 536 n.l.
71. Id.at 534 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
72. See Stephen M. Feldman, DiagnosingPower.Postmodernismin Legal ScholarshipandJudicialPractice(with
an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas CorpusCases), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1046, 1050 (1994)

('Postmodern insights gleaned from philosophical hermeneutics facilitate a deconstruction of the Court's crucial distinction
between old and new rules of constitutional law: any constitutional rule
can be categorized as both old and new."
(emphasis in original)); Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionof Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30 (1993) (assessing the Court's approach to the
legitimacy of constitutional change set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 1791 (1992)).
73. Liverpool, N. Y. &Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33,39 (1885) (emphasis added).
74. Webster, 492 U.S. at 534 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring inthejudgment). Justice Scalia's flexible
approach to the rule of measured steps is an interesting contrast to his preference for rules instead of flexible standards
in other contexts. See Sullivan, supranote 15.
75. Webster, 492 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
76. The Court found that, because the preamble had not been applied or threatened to be applied to restrict the
activities of the Webster plaintiffs in a "concrete" manner, no justiciable case or controversy was presented. The Court
reasoned:
It will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to restrict the
activities of appellees in some concrete way. Until then, this Court "is not empowered to decide ... abstract
propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
result as to the thing in issue in the case before it."
Id.
at 506-07 (plurality opinion) (quoting Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409 (1900)); see also

1996]

MEASURED CONSTITUTIONAL STEPS

challenge to the portion of the statute forbidding public employee abortion counseling.77
Moreover, O'Connor concurred on narrow grounds with the plurality's rejection of
plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute's ban on the use of public facilities and public
employees for abortions.7 ' She noted that a facial challenge to a statute is the most
difficult type, "'since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.'"7
Finally, the Justices relied on another component of the avoidance doctrine in
interpreting the viability testing provision. In discussing the testing provision's meaning,
both O'Connor and the plurality referenced the component of the avoidance doctrine
which provides that "'statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties"'
when possible." The five Justices construed the testing provision in a way that saved it
from constitutional infirmity. The dissenters found application of this rule improper
because they found the viability testing provision unambiguously mandatory. They
reasoned that the rule of avoiding constitutionally infirm interpretations of statutes only
applies when the statute is ambiguous."
E. Conclusion
Webster serves as a good illustration of the need to develop a coherent approach to the
rule of measured steps. The debate among theJustices about the rule has important
ramifications for the scope of the Court's holding and the development of constitutional
law on abortion regulation. Thus, application of the rule is inextricably linked to the
direction and development of constitutional law in a given context. Webster also
demonstrates the complexity of defining measuredness.
Now that the stakes of the debate are set out, the next Part of this Article uses Webster
to assess the rule's justifications. It examines whether Webster can be classified as a
measured step and evaluates the rule's impact on the constitutional dialogue about
abortion.

id. at 523 (O'Connor, L, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

The plurality also cited a major standing case. Id at 507 (plurality opinion) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)). Additionally, the Court refused to
entertain a claim that the preamble violates the Missouri constitution, finding it "inappropriate for a federal court to pass
upon this claim before the state courts have interpreted the statute." Id at 507 n.6.
77. Id.
at 512; see also id at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
78. Acknowledging that some potential applications of the ban on the use of public facilities might be
unconstitutional, she found it unnecessary to address those questions in Webster. Under precedent, some applications of
the ban were constitutional, and that was sufficient to defeat the facial challenge. Id at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see Michael C. Dorf,Facial Challengesto State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.

REV. 235 (1994) (providing an extensive and insightfl treatment of facial challenge doctrines).
79. Webster, 495 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting United
States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
80. Id at 514 (plurality opinion) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988)); see Kloppenberg, supra note
I, at 1024 nn.106-09 (discussing the seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 223
(1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
81. Webster, 495 US. at 562 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun called this
a "disingenuous" scolding of the lower court. The problem "is not that it raised a constitutional difficulty, but that it raised
the wrong constitutional difficulty--one not implicating Roe." Id at 546 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see Dorf,supranote 78.
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IV. ADVANTAGES OF MEASURED CONSTITUTIONAL
RULINGS
This Part explores the two primary policies underlying the rule of measured steps,
which overlap with justifications for the broader avoidance doctrine.' 2 First, measured
constitutional rulings by courts might promote deference to other constitutional
decisionmakers, thus encouraging them to participate more fully in the development of
constitutional law. Second, measured rulings might allow for more gradual development
in constitutional law by promoting laboratories for decisions in many forums across the
country. I consider whether and how measured rulings promote a long-term dialogue
about constitutional issues among multiple participants. Do measured steps by the Court
increase the deference afforded other participants? If so, what type of deference is
afforded? Do measured steps by the Court increase gradualism in development of
constitutional law?
Although I reference other cases involving the rule of measured steps, I focus primarily
on Webster for the reasons explained in Part III. I conclude that the necessary inquiries
are complex, and suggest some ways in which Webster was a measured step, although I
dispute the plurality's claim that it took a measured step. The majority result in Webster
was measured in that it signaled that other constitutional actors shared with the Court the
responsibility for determining the scope of abortion rights and restrictions. The
majority's approach also allowed time for new developments and fervent political
response while preserving some core of Roe.
Part V uses the current litigation in the lower federal courts regarding gays in the
military to consider further the costs and benefits of measured rulings. Taken together,
Parts IV and V argue that courts employing the rule of measured steps must undertake a
multifactored analysis. Courts should determine in what way their rulings are measured
before invoking the rule. The courts should consider both how their rulings promote the
justifications for measured steps and at what cost. Both Parts IV and V demonstrate that
the effects of avoidance can differ depending on the level of the, court using the rule.
Finally, these Parts show that the rule is not neutral and that the substantive context of
decision cannot be divorced from application of the procedural rule.
A. Deference to Other Decisionmakers
The Supreme Court's primary justification for the rule is that narrower decisions on
constitutional issues promote deference to other decisionmakers. For example, in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court found constitutional the Federal Communication
Commission's regulation of a broadcaster for airing George Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue. s3 A father who heard the broadcast with his young son complained to the

82. Six justifications support the avoidance doctrine. I have previously argued that four of these justifications,
including concerns for the Court's credibility, the final and delicate nature of constitutional adjudication, and the
importance of constitutional adjudication, should be given less weight. Instead, respecting prudential concerns for
federalism and separation of powers are more appropriate considerations in employing the doctrine. Kloppenberg, supra
note 1,at 1035-65; see also James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A CommunitarianDefense of Judicial
Restraint,71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 833-46 (1993) (grouping the justifications somewhat differently and arguing that such
doctrines ofjudicial restraint are essential strategies for social inclusion).
83. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978).
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FCC. The FCC found the broadcast indecent but not obscene, and imposed a penalty on
the broadcaster. The Court's decision is a measured step in the sense that the ruling
extended only to the FCC's regulation of that particular monologue via radio at a time
when children were likely to be present. The Court did not consider whether the content
of the broadcast would be unprotected at other times or through another medium. The two
concurring Justices relied explicitly on the rule of measured steps in emphasizing the
narrowness of the 5-4 ruling in the FCC's favor.8 4 They reasoned that their narrow ruling
allowed for deference to administrative decisionmakers and Congress in a developing
field of law, reflecting regard for separation of powers by affording other actors the
opportunity to develop law concurrently with the Supreme Court in this area."5
Earlier, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 6 Justice Brandeis similarly relied
on the rule of measured steps and other portions of the avoidance doctrine in his famous
concurrence. In Ashwander, the Court considered a federal constitutional challenge to an
important New Deal program, the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"). 7 The plaintiffs
essentially claimed that the federal government had exceeded its powers at the expense
of state power. The Court affirmed the validity of some contracts the TVA had entered
into and refused to reach the broader challenge to the TVA program. By avoiding the
broader challenge, the Court allowed Congress and the TVA to retain control over the
program, at least pending further legal challenges. This use of the rule demonstrates
Brandeis' concern with the countermajoritarian difficulty and his desire to defer
frequently to the legislative branch, particularly when reviewing the constitutionality of
statutes. He joined the Court at the end of the economically libertarian Lochner era, and
as a strong supporter of progressive legislation, he urged the Court to play a more
restrained, self-censoring role in reviewing the acts of legislatures for constitutional
compliance. 8
Later, Justice Frankfurter and Professor Bickel often advocated a similar role for the
Court, relying heavily on Brandeis' views of the federal courts' institutional
competence. 9 During the last fifty years, the Court has often used the deference rationale
when it applies the rule.9" In Staub v. City of Baxley, for example, the Warren Court

84. Id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
85. Id See Thomas W. Merrill,JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. 969(1992), for discussion
of the rule created in Chevron "that federal courts defer to any reasonable interpretation by an agency charged with

administration of a statute, provided Congress has not clearly specified a contrary answer," and its "draconian" balance-ofpower implications which have resulted in policy-driven inconsistent application by the Court. Id. at 969, 970-71. In
contrast, Merrill suggests a model which employs varying degrees of deference based on multiple contextual factors. Id.
at 971.
86.297 U.S. 288 (1936).
87. Id at 347.
88. BOBBrrr, supra note 23, at 61-65, 68-71 (discussing the political background and jurisprudential approaches of
Brandeis); Horwitz, supranote 72, at 52, 53 & n.99 (characterizing Brandeis' approach as centered in his Progressive
polities and pragmatism); see also WILLIAM G.ROSS, AMtrED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994); PHILLIPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESStvISM (Wilson C.
McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 1993); SUNSTEIN, supranote 25, at 41-53; LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMINGTHE
FEDERAL COURTS 58 (1994).
89. BOBBrrr, supranote 23, at 61-73 (describing views of Brandeis, Frankfirter, and Bickel); Stolzenberg, supra
note 42 (describing views of Frankfu ter, Bickel, and Robert Cover); Judith Resnik, The Brandeis/FrankfurterConnection,
71 CAL. L. REV. 776 (1983) (reviewing BRUCE A. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 1982). For an
excellent grounding in legal process scholarship, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFICNATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973). See also William N. Eskridge & Gary Peller, The New
PublicLaw Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991).
90. See, e.g., United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (refusing to reach question of constitutionality of
honoraria ban as applied to senior federal government officials); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978); Staub
v. City ofBaxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325-26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol.71:297

struck down a municipal ordinance in Georgia as violative of the First Amendment. 9'
Justice Frankfurter dissented:
This is one ofthose small cases that carry large issues, for it concerns the essence of our
federalism-due regard for the constitutional distribution of power as between the
Nation and the States, and more particularly the distribution of judicial power as
between this Court and the judiciaries of the States.9"
He accused the Court of ignoring a Georgia procedural rule requiring explicit
particularity in pleadings in order to raise constitutional issues. The state courts relied on
this rule to reject the litigant's general challenge to the ordinance's constitutionality.'
Frankfurter insisted that this was an adequate and independent state ground for the
decision, which the Georgia courts had not adopted merely to evade the federal
constitutional issue, and that therefore the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider
the federal issue.94 Frankfurter argued that the Georgia rule was consistent with the
Court's own practices of "keeping constitutional adjudication, when unavoidable, as
narrow as circumstances will permit."95
In Frankfurter's view, deference to state procedural rules, including state techniques
for avoiding decision of constitutional issues, not only respected federalism concerns, but
also permitted the Court to "protect itself from the necessity-sometimes even the
tempttion-of adjudicating overly broad claims of unconstitutionality." 96 He deemed
this critical because "declar[ing] a law unconstitutional is 'the most important and
delicate duty of this Court"' and because the Court does not sit to render advisory
97
opinions over the action of Congress and the states.
The deference rationale supporting measured steps, however, does not completely
transfer the judgment of constitutionality to another branch of government or to the
states, as the use of the political question doctrine does. Instead, reliance on the rule
postpones a court judgment of constitutionality to a later lawsuit. Thus, other
decisionmakers act knowing that the constitutional issue can and often will return to the
courts. In the meantime, the courts leave room for change and gradual development of
law concerning constitutional issues. On -the other hand, some measured steps can result
in ambiguity or uncertainty in the content of constitutional law. Similarly, measured steps
may produce less uniform application of constitutional law. The costs of measured steps
will be explored as the disadvantages are assessed more fully in Part V.
1. A Description of Constitutional Dialogue
When the federal courts defer by use of the rule, other constitutional actors can
participate more fully with the Court in interpreting the Constitution over time. This type
of deference encourages others to lead in developing constitutional law, or at least be
more active partners with the Court in doing so. Justice Ginsburg, while al intermediate
appellate judge, similarly urged federal courts to engage primarily in measured
decisionmaking-advocating small, incremental steps in constitutional law-in part

91. 355 U.S. at 325 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 325-26.
93. Id. at 327.
94. See Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1061-65.
95. Staub, 355 U.S. at 330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 331.
97. Id. at 330-31 (quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1957)).
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because such steps afford the opportunity for more constitutional "dialogue.""0 For
example, after the Court issued its Pacificaruling, broadcasters could still air the Carlin
monologue in different circumstances, and the FCC could draw lines about what conduct
was punishable. Similarly, Webster left ambiguities for abortion regulation and created
a vacuum to be filled by the reaction of other constitutional actors. Before studying that
reaction, this Part sets forth an initial definition of constitutional dialogue as a process
with multiple facets.
Potential dialogic participants from outside the federal judiciary include the President,
Congress, administrative agencies-and executive officers, state courts, state executive and
legislative officials, police officers, attorneys general, academics, the media, lobbyists,
interest groups, and the general public. 9 When the Supreme Court defers, it also affords
other courts a more significant role in the dialogue. The back-and-forth among the federal
courts and these other actors is part of a complex, long-term process of constitutional
00
conversation or colloquy.
For example, while ajudicial decree binds the litigants in the case, it is not necessarily
the last word on the constitutional issues decided in the case.' 0' Law-trained judges and
scholars focus too much attention on the Supreme Court's role as principal and
final-almost sole-arbiter of constitutional values. 1 2 Instead, we need to understand the
process of constitutional interpretation from a broader perspective and assess the
development of constitutional law "over the long haul." 0 3

98. Ginsburg, supra note 4. Ginsburg describes the appropriate substance of federal court decisions in a section
entitled "Measured Motions in Third Branch Decisionmaking" Ginsburg cites Justice Holmes for his caution that federal
judges legislate "only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions" Id at 1198.
99. LouIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 5, 8 (1988).
100. Scholars are providing more descriptions and analyses of this process. See BICKEL, supranote 25; BOBBIT,
supranote 23; Fisher, supra note 99; SUNsTEIN, supranote 25; Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism: HabeasCorpus and the Court, 86 YALE LU. 1035 (1977) (suggesting that federal habeas corpus may be
viewed as constitutional dialogue between the state and federal courts about the nature and content of federal constitutional
rights); Friedman, supra note 50; Robert A. Katzmann, The UnderlyingConcerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTTrUrIONAL Comrry 14 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LU. 1493
(1988). Dialogue is a theme present in pragmatism, feminism, communitarian theory, and other aspects of what has been
termed the "New Public Law Movement." See Eskridge & Peller, supranote 89.
10 1. Friedman, supranote 50, at 644; see BICKEt., supranote 25, at 203, 247-48; BOBBrrr, supra note 23, at 237;
Ann Althouse, Standing. in Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177 (1991). Louis Fisher states that the lower federal courts
and other actors must translate the Court's rulings into action. Ambiguities in the Court's opinions affect the translation,
as does the authority of the other actors to interpret and implement the constitutional principles. FISHER, supranote 99,
at 7-8; see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 15-17, 91
(1991) (citing vague appellate court orders and power of lower courts to delay change or filter higher court commands
through their own discretionary powers).
102. Fisher gives examples of constitutional dialogue and describes a "complicated, subtle process-far removed from
the simple and beguiling model of the Supreme Court issuing the 'final word."' FISHER, supranote 99, at 3; see id at 8
(discussing misperception of the Court as the principal and final arbiter of the Constitution); see also ROBERT A. BURT,
TIE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 353 (1992) ("The Court's chronic conceit, that its constitutional command should be
the last word on fundamentally disputed issues, thus recurrently stumbles over the order implicitly established by the
Constitution itself."); ROSENBERG, supranote 101, at 338-43 (positing that by focusing primarily on courts for social
reform, people risk weakening more effective political reform efforts); SUNSTEIN, supranote 25, at 9 (noting that people
too closely identify the meaning of the Constitution with the Supreme Court's interpretations ofit); cf.Herbert A. Eastman,
Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,104 YALE L. 763, 807-08 (1995) (discussing how
heavy reliance on courts in the development of civil rights, particularly the language and form of legal pleadings,
constrains the civil.rights movement).
103. Abram Chayes has described this "plastic and fluid" process of'maldng, implementing and modifying law in
a public law system":
Popular participation in it is not alone through the vote or by representation in the legislature. And judicial
participation is not by way of sweeping and immutable statements of the law, but in the form of a continuous and
rather tentative dialogue with other political elements-Congress and the executive, administrative agencies, the
profession and the academics, the press and wider publics. Bentham's "judge and company" has become a
conglomerate. In such a setting, the ability of a judicial pronouncement to sustain itself in the dialogue and the

INDIA NA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol.71:297

In every constitutional ruling, the Court announces principles of constitutional law. But
those principles are developed as they are applied in subsequent litigation involving
different factual or legal arguments."'° The Court has revised its own pronouncements on
constitutional principles over time-it regularly distinguishes precedent and occasionally
makes a significant alteration in its former interpretation of a constitutional principle.0 5
Moreover, in response to constitutional rulings, legislatures may enact slightly different
laws and executive officials may promulgate new regulations which pose new challenges
to those principles in the state and federal courts.0 6
Congress occasionally may need to address a constitutional ruling through the more
cumbersome, "super majoritarian" process of amending the Constitution. But frequently
Congress can respond to the Court's constitutional decisions without amending the
Constitution. If the Court implies a private cause of action for damages in the
Constitution, Congress might be able to provide a meaningful alternative and preclude
such relief.0 7 Congress can provide greater rights by statute and has substantial power
to enact legislation to implement equal protection guarantees.' 0 The President's

power ofjudicial action to generate assent over the long haul become the ultimate touchstones of legitimacy.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1316 (1976) (emphasis in
original). Louis Fisher also characterizes the process:
Judges act within an environment that constantly tests the reasonableness and acceptability of their rulings. Courts
hand down the "last word" only for an instant, for after the release of an opinion the process of interaction begins:
with Congress, the President, executive agencies, states, professional associations, law journals, and the public at
large.
FISHER, supra note 99, at 200; see also BURT, supranote 102, at 68-69 (describing the Madisonian view that for longterm development of constitutional law, courts and other constitutional actors are interdependent).
104. BOBBIT, supranote 23, at 224-25; Friedman, supranote 50, at 652; Martha Minow, InterpretingRights: An
EssayforRobert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987).
105. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812-15 (1992) (describing the overruling of Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and the rejection of the constitutional
ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); accordGarcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (explicitly overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), and extending the application of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause to state functions,
regardless of the nature of those functions). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (weakening Garcia
significantly without expressly overruling it).
106. Fisher cites numerous examples of such interaction from the mid-1900's to the present, including interaction
between the federal branches on legislation and regulation concerning pregnancy discrimination, Title IX, the fairness
doctrine, and labor legislation. FISHER, supra note 99, at 207-09, 249-51, 257-60; see also BURT, supra note 102, at 30609 (discussing Congressional authority to enact legislation implementing the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael S. Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing that the
President's constitutional interpretive authority is co-equal with that of the courts and Congress, and independent of their
pronouncements). But see Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory GulfBetween Courts andCongress: A Challenge
for Positive PoliticalTheory, 80 GEO. L. REv. 653 (1992) (discussing the findings of a Governance Institute project
suggesting that Congress and the federal courts are largely unaware of the other branches' activities which relate to their
own work).
107. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.7 (Harlan, J., concurring in
thejudgment) (refusing to take a stand and reading the majority as not taking a stand on whether Congress could alter the
implied cause of action recognized in Bivens). Note that Congress' ability to reverse Supreme Court decisions may be
limited to issues of statutory construction and may exclude some "constitutional" determinations. Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court in Patterson,stated: "Considerations of stare
decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Id at 172-73.
But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-81 (1992). Justices Kennedy and Souter, in their concurring
opinion, note that Congress may be able to redefine what constitutes a new case or controversy by providing definitions
of injury and causation. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What'sStandingAflerLujan? Of
Citizen Suits. Injuries.andAricle 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,201-02 (1992).
108. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e. (Supp. 1993) (countering Supreme Court rulings
countenancing discrimination against pregnant employees). Recent legislation proposed in the U.S. Senate authorizes the
U.S. Attorney General to act immediately to protect reproductive health care clinics from violence. S. Res. 31, 104th
Cong., Ist Seas. (1995).
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enforcement, criticism of, or inattention to a Court decision can also be important." 9
Moreover, the interaction between the Court and executive branch members may also
influence the development of constitutional law." 0
The public may play a critical role in bringing about significant constitutional change,
whether through the formal amendment process or through informal alterations of
constitutional meaning."' Those dissatisfied with a court's rulings can often take a
constitutional issue to a different forum in new litigation. For example, when a Supreme
Court decision concerns the meaning of a right guarantee, citizens of states with the same
or similar state guarantees can respond at a state constitutional level." 2 Nonjudicial actors
sometimes respond via nonenforcement or deliberate resistance to judicial decisions."3
There is also a more diffused public role in the process of developing constitutional law,
which surely includes press and public reception to a court's rulings on specific issues.4
At another level, justices and scholars have recognized that, to some extent, the federal
courts are dependent upon the public and nonjudicial political actors to make their
constitutional rulings effective."'.
This description contains several facets of long-term interaction between the federal
courts and other actors on constitutional issues. One aspect of this long-term dialogue
about a constitutional issue is how others respond to a court decision-from heightened
public awareness of an issue to formulation of specific responses by concerned groups
or individuals through lobbying, new litigation, and other political acts. A second facet
involves legislative or executive action specifically addressing a court decision. A third
is an exchange of views over time between courts and other governmental actors on an

109. FISHER, supranote 99, at 61,244. For example, Fisher cites President Carter's decision to abide by the Court's
abortion rulings despite his personal opposition to abortion. Carter, however, actively supported legislation reversing the
Court's rulings in the free speech area. Id at 27. Gerald Rosenberg concludes that civil rights reform was primarily
influenced by executive and legislative action rather than the Court's decision in Brawn. ROSENBERG, supranote 101,
at 70-71.
110. See. e.g., FISHER, supranote 99, at 24-27 (citing interaction between the executive and courts); ROSENBERG,

supranote 101, at 14 (discussing the Solicitor General's relationship to the Supreme Court).
111. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453, 459 (1989) (arguing that "the New Deal Democrats amended the
Constitution by provoking a complex constitutional dialogue between the voters at large and the institutions of the national
government").
112. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that a state may "adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Prneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)
(citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). In contrast to the Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), several state courts have found private consensual same-sex sexual activity
protected by state constitutions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Michigan Org. for
Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9,1990); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
113. BICKEL, supranote 25, at 254-72 (discussing public and governmental reaction to school desegregation decisionsof the Court); BOBBrr, supranote 23, at 196-211 (citing resistance to the Court's school prayer rulings); Garrett Epps,
The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 19 (1993) (describing
southern resistance to integration of public schools after Brown v. Board of Education);Friedman, supranote 50, at 608,
644-52; Dee Lane, Suicide: Status Quo Likely, Law orNot, OREGONIAN, Dec. 29,1994, at Al ('Doctors will keep helping
people commit suicide in spite of a federal judge's ruling that Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law must wait for legal

review....').
114. BOBBIrr, supra note 23, at 234-49 (describing participation by observers in the process of developing
constitutional meaning). Bobbitt concludes his work by writing that, "[olur teachers were wrong, captivated by a picture
of a dancing class, ignoring the inseparable unribboning relationship between the motion that law must be and the
participant-spectators whose presence makes the motion meaningful." Id at 249; see Chayes, supranote 103, at 1316.
115. ALEXANDERM. BicKEI., MORAI.r=Y OF CONSENT 101-02, 111 (1975); BICKEL, supranote 25, at 235; FISHER,
supra note 99, at 12; Friedman, supra note 50, at 682 ("The problem with the countermajoritarian difficulty is that it
overstatesthe role of courts and thus understates society's responsibility." (emphasis in original)); David B. Frohnmayer,
The SeparationofPowers:An Essay on the Fitality ofa ConstitutionalIdea, 52 OR. L. REV. 211 (1973); William W. Van
Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKELJ. 1.

INDIANA LAWJOURNTAL

[Vol.71:297

issue via enforcement efforts and funding decisions. This Part and Part V examine some
problems with a dialogic vision of constitutional law development, but they do not fully
explore the many forms of dialogue or assess the conditions necessary for a fair and
meaningful long-term dialogue." 6 However, I am convinced that some kind of dialogue,
exchange, or long-term interaction occurs between these various actors on constitutional
issues. The description should help us consider whether and how the rule ofmeasured
steps influences or advances thatprocess.
For example, some measured rulings by the Supreme Court promote deference by
simply allowing time for others to respond to the ruling. During that time, new factual
patterns may develop to challenge application of the Court's earlier holding. Underlying
social beliefs, conditions, or moral consensus may change. Some Justices and/or the
views of some Justices may change. A measured ruling could invite new challenges on
other grounds, leaving ambiguity in some aspects of constitutional law but creating the
perception that the Court makes room for the participation of others or will be cognizant
of the reactions of other constitutional interpreters. Although Webster was not measured
in all its aspects, this Article contends below that it used the rule of measured steps to
influence the constitutional conversation about abortion in several ways.
2. Use of the Rule in Webster and Its Impact on the
Abortion Debate
The Webster decision appears to have generated substantial reaction. This Part of the
Article considers whether Webster was a measured ruling which provided deference to
other constitutional actors, and whether the use of the rule influenced the constitutional
conversation about abortion. I argue that Webster was a measured ruling in certain
respects. The plurality's approach was not a measured step because it treated precedent
extremely narrowly. However, O'Connor's approach to precedent and her construction
of the Missouri statute made the majority result in Webster more measured. The majority
result in Webster was measured in that it did not completely overrule Roe, nor did it
announce a clear new principle to replace Roe. Instead, it signaled a directional shift in
constitutional law without formulating a rigid rule. Some other constitutional actors thus
perceived the Court as transferring to or sharing with them the power of developing the
constitutional law regulating abortion. The decision sparked intense reaction which
forced some f6rmerly neutral politicians to make their positions clear on abortion
regulation.
This sharing of power was not a complete abdication of the federal courts' role in
addressing the abortion issue. The measured result in Webster afforded time for the Court
to listen to the reaction to Webster before it decided another major abortion challenge.
Between Webster and the next major ruling'' 7 -which affirmed parts of Roe-numerous
constitutional actors voiced their views on the abortion issue, the composition of the
Justices changed, one Justice altered his position, and new legislation provided further
factual development of issues and new legal challenges. This Part evaluates whether these
effects are desirable.

116. I hope to develop a more thorough assessment of constitutional dialogue conditions and pursue further examples
of constitutional dialogue in my future work.
117. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see infra part IVA.2.c.3.
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a. Response by the Public to JVebster
After the Webster decision, individuals and organizations engaged in a spirited debate
with public officials and political candidates about the constitutionality of abortion
restrictions. Pro-choice advocates strenuously lobbied to force politicians to protect a
woman's choice."' Pro-choice advocates who had entrusted this "choice" to the Supreme
Court realized it was not secure and began demanding that their representatives protect
their right to choose.' 9 Pro-life advocates engaged in similar activities, and the National
20
Right-to-Life Committee proposed model legislation.
Joining the dialogue, the press was also active in reporting on the abortion issue,
predicting what was likely to happen in the states regarding abortion after Webster. 2 '
22
Likewise, academic writers heavily critiqued the Court's decision.
b. Suddenly the Big Issue in Electoral Politics at
Federal and State Levels
Politicians immediately felt pressure to formulate positions on the abortion issue. 2 For
example, David Frohnmayer, former attorney general of Oregon and Republican
candidate for governor, had been involved in state politics for twelve years prior to the
Webster decision. Although he strongly supported choice, he did not consider abortion
a significant political issue in Oregon prior to Webster because of the perception that the

118. For example, Kate Michelman, the Executive Director of the National Abortion Rights Action League
("NARAL"), stated: "To politicians who oppose choice, we say, 'Read our lips. Take our rights. Lose your jobs."'
Margaret Carlson, The Battle overAbortion, TIME, July 17, 1989, at 62, 63.
119. NARAL, Planned Parenthood, NOW, ACLU, and the Fund for the Feminist Majority were among many prochoice groups that met only a few days after Webster to determine how best to oppose the pro-life movement in state
legislatures and Congress. LAURENCEH. TRsBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OFABSOLUTES 178 (1990).
120. A National Right-to-Life Committee spokeswoman said, "Webster really did change everything, by saying for
the first time that limits on abortion would be allowed. So we have been drafting and working for legislation that we feel
would be upheld under the Webster standards." Tamar Lewin, States Testing the Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIWES, Apr.
2,1990, at A14. Provisions of the proposed model legislation include: forbidding abortion asmeans of birth control and
for sex selection, requiring informed consent and parental consent, establishing a father's right in choosing whether to
abort, and preventing public hospitals from performing abortions. Id
121. For example, Newsweek predicted that 10 states were likely to keep abortion legal, 19 were likely to restrict
abortion, and 22 states were battlegrounds. Countdown: The Wars Within the States, NEwswEEK, July 17, 1989, at 24.
US. News & World Report gave somewhat different numbers. It predicted that 14 states were likely to keep their present
laws allowing abortion, 27 states were likely to restrict abortion more, and nine were battlegipunds. Ted Gest et al., The
Abortion Furor,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 17, 1989, at 18,20-21.
122. See Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 56, at 83 (stating that the "plurality's backdoor approach allowed it to
eviscerate Roe without explicitly overruling the case"); Estrich & Sullivan, supranote 56, at 123-24 (calling the plurality's
use of a low standard of review "hypocritical").
123. For example, only hours after the Webster decision, Congressman James Florio, who was running for governor
ofNew Jersey, announced that he, if elected, would veto legislation restricting access to abortion. His opponent, Jim
Courter, first supported the right to life. Later, Florio
decreased his support by saying he would not oppose such legislation,
but he would not lobby for it. NARAL Executive Director Kate Michelman said, "the New Jersey gubernatorial race is
the first example of what we aregoing to do around the country." The pro-choice group contributed asmuch as $500,00t
to the race and Florio, the pro-choice candidate, prevailed. TIsBE, supra note 119, at 189. Courter's opposition to abortion
was a major factor in his defeat. R.W.Apple, Jr., The Abortion Question: Bacldash at the Polls, N.Y. TIams, Nov. 9, 1989,
at B14.
David Frohnmayer, Oregon's attorney general at the time of Webster, attended a conference of other attorneys general
and candidates for elective office shortly after the Court released Webster. He recalled that many of those politicians who
had been reluctant to declare their position on legal access to abortion, or who did not feel compelled to state a position
due to Roe, felt pressure after Webster to take a position. In particular, three Catholic attorneys general who were running
for gubernatorial positions in major states issued strong pro-choice statements shortly after Webster. Interview with David
B. Frohnmayer, President of the University of Oregon, in Eugene, Or. (May 13, 1994).
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Court had essentially foreclosed state legislative and executive action in the area with
Roe. After the Court's display of weak support for Roe in Webster, abortion suddenly
became a dominant and defining issue for local politicians in Oregon. 24 Two restrictive
initiatives went on the next Oregon ballot, and the issue was critical to the next
125
governor's race.
Significant time and money were devoted to the issue of abortion in other state
electoral races in the aftermath of Webster."6 Candidates' decisions on their political
stances may have affected decisions to pursue, or not pursue, litigation challenging
abortion regulation. 27 Pro-choice Republicans argued that the party's pro-life stance
would prove to be "political suicide."' 28 Professor Laurence Tribe characterizes this as
a change from the past, when pro-life advocates had held politicians accountable for their
votes in a way that pro-choice voters did not.'29 Perhaps this is because pro-choice
advocates had previously relied primarily or exclusively on the Supreme Court to guard
the right of choice. 3
c. State Responses to Webster
1. Executive BranchResponse
Incumbent governors responded quickly to Webster by fighting attempts to ban
abortions from public hospitals' and promising to veto any restrictions on Medicaid
funding. 3 2 Several governors refused to allow their legislatures to take up the abortion

124. Interview with David B. Frohnmayer, President of the University of Oregon, in Eugene, Or. (Aug. 22, 1995);
Interview with David B. Frohmayer, supra note 123. Political scientists would classify this as a "salient" issue.
Frohnmayernoted that the issue was salient to the electoral race in Oregon in several ways. It led to the formation of an
independent political party, backed by evangelical Christian groups, which sponsored a pro-life gubernatorial candidate.
The Republican vote was thus split between pro-choice and pro-life male candidates, and the pro-choice female
Democratic candidate won the election.
125. See THE OREGON BLUE BOOK 353 (1995) (summarizing contents of restrictive abortion measures on the
November 1990 ballot).
126. In a special election for a California state legislative seat the California Abortion Rights Action League
("CARAL") "poured time and resources" into supporting the pro-choice Republican candidate; the candidate won. TRIBE,
supranote 119, at 179. In Virginia, L. Douglas Wilder, the Democratic nominee for governor, was pro-choice but had
supported parental consent laws. The executive director of Virginia League for Planned Parenthood warned Wilder that
if he remained vague on the abortion issue, it would cost him the election. Id at 185. Wilder beat his Republican opponent
who opposed abortion. Apple, supranote 123, at B14. In South Carolina, another pro-choice Republican (the only prochoice candidate of eight), won a special election for a seat in the House of Representatives of the South Carolina General
Assembly. TRIBE, supranote 119, at 179-80.
127. In Illinois, the potential democratic nominee for governor, Neil Hartigan (who was the attorney general of Illinois
at the time of Webster), had announced his personal opposition to abortion. After pressure from pro-choicers, he switched
to the pro-choice side: "I support the woman's freedom of choice." George J.Church, Five PoliticalHot Spots In Some
States the AbortionBattle Is Already nearBoiling Point,TIME, July 17, 1989, at 64. Hartigan's switch is best identified
by his choice to settle an abortion case two weeks prior to oral arguments before the Supreme Court. The case involved
regulations that would have closed 80% of Illinois' abortion clinics. The settlement suggested that Hartigan knew
continued prosecution of the case would be politically fatal; as Kate Miebelman said, Hartigan had learned that "you can't
travel the road to public office by forcing women to detour to the back alleys for health care." TRIBE, supranote 119, at
190-91.
128. TRIBE, supranote 119, at 189.
129. Id at 179.
130. Antiabortion advocates were more successful in state legislatures before Webster because pro-choice voters
"ignored [pro-life] bills, comfortable that the fundamental right to abortion was already protected by the courts." David
Whitman et al., The Abortion Hype, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2, 1990, at 20, 21.
131. Eloise Salholz et al., Voting in Curbs andConfitsion, NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1989, at 16 (discussing efforts of
Mario Cuomo in New York).
132. Dan Balz, LegislaturesSet to Struggle with Abortion, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1989, at A4.
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issue in fall special sessions,'33 and another governor promised to veto any antiabortion
law. 3 4 In some states, governors tried to use their veto power to prevent pro-life
legislation from becoming law. 3 ' Other executive officials who presided over legislative
bodies blocked consideration of antiabortion bills. 36 In sum, the gubernatorial
demographics regarding the abortion issue appeared to change considerably during the
two years after Webster. In 1989, only sixteen governors were openly pro-choice. Two
years later, twenty-six governors supported choice, while the number advocating
restrictions on abortion remained constant at twenty-three.'1 7 Thus, some formerly
"neutral" governors seemed to "get off the fence," at least in part in reaction to Webster.
2. The Response ofState Legislatures

After Webster, state legislatures debated the abortion issue extensively.'

Within six

months of Webster, only Pennsylvania had passed a statute restricting access to abortion,
resulting in the Court's undue burden formulation in Casey.'39 One year after Webster,
South Carolina 4 and Guam 4 ' enacted statutes restricting abortions. Within the next year,

Utah,'

14 s
Louisiana,'43 and Ohio' 44 passed restrictive statutes.

133. Don . DeBenedictis, Abortion Battles: State Legislatures Wrestle with ProposedRestrictions,A.B.A. J.,
Feb.
1990, at 30, 30-31.
134. Countdown: The Wars Within the States,supranote 121, at 24.
135. For example, in Michigan, Mississippi, and Idaho, governors vetoed legislation. In Mississippi, however, the
Governor's veto was overridden. Legislation:Abortion Bills Nationwide, ABORTION REP., July 17, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File.
136. Id.(discussing actions in the Texas and Georgia legislatures).
137. Michael J.Malinowski, "HelloDad ThisIs Your Daughter.CanIGetAn Abortion?". An Esay on the Minor's
Pight to a ConfidenialAbontion,in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 182,198 (J.
Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert
eds, 4th ed. 1992) (citing NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACnON LEAGUE, WHO DECIDES?: A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW
OF ABORTION RIGHTS iv (1991)).
138. Fourteen state legislatures conducted floor votes by April, 1990. Lewin, supranote 120. By July, 1990, over 300
abortion-related bills were considered by state legislatures in at least 40 states. Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since
Webster, Abortion DebateDefies Predictions,WASH. POST, July 3, 1990, at Al.
139. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
140. South Carolina passed a law requiring parental consent for minors seeking abortions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-36
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
141. In 1990, the governor of Guam signed a bill that banned virtually all abortions. See Guam Pub. L. No. 20-134
(1990), permanently enjoinedby Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
142. In 1990, the Utah legislature introduced several abortion bills, but none were formally considered. Instead, they
adopted a resolution stating that the legislature favored childbirth and should conduct investigations in order to have
abortion legislation the next session. In 1991, the Legislature passed a bill and the Governor signed it. The statute placed
a number of restrictions on abortion, including a provision restricting abortion only to cases of incest, rape, grave damage
to the woman's health, or grave defects to the fetus. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(2) (1995).
143. Balz & Marcus, supranote 138, at Al. After the Supreme Court's decision in Webster, the Louisiana state
legislature passed a resolution calling on district attorneys to enforce 19th-century criminal abortion statutes that were still
on the books. DeBenedictis, supranote 133, at 30. The resolution stated, "Therefore, be it resolved that it is the intent of
the Legislature of Louisiana that the district attorneys ofthis state shall enforce the criminal statutes pertaining to abortion
...
to the fullest extent." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1995) (historical and statutory notes). This resolution
passed over the Governor's veto.Abortion Test Cases,TIME, July 1, 1991, at 22.
144. In Ohio, a statute restricting abortion passed and was signed by the Governor. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.56(B) (Anderson 1995); see also Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(discussing the constitutionality of Ohio's consent requirements).
145. See Malinowski, supra note 137, at 199 n.73.
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Two years after Webster, two states had passed pro-choice legislation: Maryland' and
Connecticut. 47 In addition, some choice advocates reported that the demographics of state
legislatures had made a pro-choice swing in the Webster aftermath.' 4'
The legislative response, in turn, spurred response by executive officials and courts,
with mixed results. In Idaho, the legislature passed a statute that almost totally banned
abortion, but the Governor vetoed the bill. 49 In Mississippi, the legislature overrode the
Governor's veto and passed a statute requiring informed consent and imposing a twentyfour hour waiting period.15 0
3. JudicialReview ofAbortion Regulation
The next major Supreme Court abortion decision after Webster concerned a challenge
to Pennsylvania's restrictive abortion statute.'' The Court in Casey upheld most of the
provisions of the statute, finding that it did not place an undue burden on a woman's right
to have a pre-viability abortion. The Court found only the spousal consent provision
unconstitutional. The Court formulated a new due process standard and specifically
reaffirmed parts of Roe.'52
After Webster, Louisiana passed a statute that criminalized abortion unless the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, the abortion was necessary to save the life of the
mother, or termination of the pregnancy was necessary to "preserve the life or helath of
the unborn baby or to remove a dead unborn child." Louisiana defended the statute by
arguing that Webster overruled Roe sub silentio. After the Supreme Court decided Casey,
the federal appellate court deemed Louisiana's law unconstitutional." Thus, the dialogue
did not end with Webster. The federal and state courts, including the Supreme Court,
remained active in construing the Constitution.
Other antiabortion statutes were invalidated, both before and after Casey. A federal
trial court invalidated parts of the Utah statute restricting abortion, including (1) its wide
prohibition against abortions except under certain circumstances, and (2) its spousal

146. In 1991, Maryland passed a pro-choice statute that respected the woman's right to choose. The statute prohibited
the state from interfering with a woman's choice before the fetus is viable and at any time when abortion is necessary to
protect the life of the woman or when the fetus is affected by a genetic defect or serious deformity. Before this statute
passed, the state had a much stricter statute that only allowed abortions in cases of incest, rape, grave endangerment to
the mother, or grave defect of the fetus. This statute was repealed at the same time the new statute was passed. MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-209 (Supp. 1994).
147. Connecticut was the first state to pass a pro-choice bill. Comiecticut: Gov. Signs-Pro-Choice Bill Becomes Law,
ABORTION REP., May 2, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File. The statute allows a woman to
terminate pregnancy prior to viability. However, the only abortions allowed post-viability are those that will preserve the
mother's life or health. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602 (Supp. 1995).
148. Pro-choice advocates considered 34 state legislative bodies more pro-choice than they were before Webster and
only thrce were considered opposed to choice. Malinowsld, supra note 137, at 197 (citing NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS
ACTION LEAGUE, supranote 137, at vi-vii).
149. Dan Balz, Idaho Republicans Feeling Fallout from Battle over Abortion, WASH. POsT, May 4, 1990, at A4.
150. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33 (1993). After Mississippi began enforcing its 24-hour waiting period, abortions
performed in the state decreased by almost 50%. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Mississippi Abortion Case,
N.Y. TortES, Dec. 8, 1992, at A22.
151. Between Webster andCasey, the Supreme Court ruled on another significant abortion case. Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991). The Department of Health and Human Services prohibitedritle X projects from engaging in abortion
counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. The Court upheld this prohibition,
holding that it did not violate the First Amendment. Id.
152. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
153. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1992), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993).
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consent requirement.' 54 Before Casey, a federal appellate court invalidated Guam's
statute, which prohibited abortions except when the mother's life was in danger.'55
Although the Supreme Court had not yet decided Casey, the court invalidated the Guam
statute, rejecting Guam's contention that Webster overruled Roe. 56
State courts also reviewed legislative responses to Webster."7 After Casey, the Ohio
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio statute.' Pro-life groups in
Oklahoma tried to bypass the state legislature and pass a restrictive abortion statute by
initiative. Before the voters voted on the initiative and after the Supreme Court's decision
in Casey, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared the initiative unconstitutional and
prohibited its submission to the voters) 59 The court implicitly noted that its outcome
under Webster might have been different. 6
4. State ConstitutionalProvisions
Amending state constitutions to protect a woman's choice is an alternative to prochoice legislation. 6' No state has an amendment explicitly acknowledging a right to
abortion. At least ten state constitutions, however, contain explicit textual privacy
provisions. 6 ' Of these ten states, two state supreme courts have explicitly held that those
provisions protect abortion rights. The California Supreme Court (pre-Webster) held that
it was unconstitutional to withhold Medi-Cal benefits from poor women who seek to
obtain an abortion. 6 a The Florida Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to an
abortion after Webster.' The timing of this case was particularly interesting. In response
to Webster, Florida's Governor Bob Martinez was the first to call a special session of the

154. JaneL. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992), rev'don othergrounds, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995)
(declaring § 76-7-302(2) and § 76-7-304(2) of the Utah Code unconstitutional). This case was decided after Casey.
155. Even the maternal health exception was very narrow, requiring two independent physicians to approve and a
committee to review each termination of pregnancy. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d
1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
156. The Ninth Circuit refused to "presum[e ... that Roe v. Wade [was] dead." Id. at 1373.

157. An antiabortion statute restricting public funding was passed by initiative in Michigan and was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Michigan. Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992).
158. Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (reviewing a statute which required
physicians to provide women seeking abortions with certain information and to obtain signed consent forms from the
women).
159. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d I (Okla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
160. The court discussed the Webster decision as beginning "a major re-examination of the law in relation to a
woman's right to obtain a nontherapeutic abortion." Id at 4. Before Casey was decided, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
intended to evaluate the initiative under the Supreme Court's holding in Webster. After Casey, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court said "the submission [of the initiative] could not go forward" Id. at 5. This implies that the decision of the
Oklahoma court would have been different solely under the holding of Webster.
161. Jeff Rosen argues that since the population of many states supports the woman's right to choose, women could
protect their right by amending state constitutions. State constitutional amendments are more protective for three reasons:
(1)they reflect the will of the voters more acurately (since they vote on the amendment); (2) they generally last longer
than the average statute; and (3) they allow the pro-choice advocates to move from the defensive to the offensive. Jeff
Rosen, Altered States: Liberals and ForgottenConstitutions,NEw REPuBLIc, July 1, 1991, at 19.
162. Natalie Wright, Note, State AbortionLaw After Casey: Finding "Adequate and Independent" GroundsforChoice

in Ohio, 54 OHio ST. LU.891, 903 (1993). The states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. See also Kimberley A. Chaput, Note, Abortion Rights Under State
Constitutions:FightingtheAbortion War in the State Courts, 70 OR. L. REV. 593 (1991) (arguing that pro-choice litigants

should protect abortion rights by expanding individual rights under state constitutions).
163. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).

164. In In re TW., the Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida Constitution required every restriction of abortion
rights to further a compelling interest in order to be lawful; therefore, under the Florida Constitution, the right to an
abortion is a fundamental one. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
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legislature to consider enacting measures restricting access to abortion. 6, Only a few days
before the special session, the state court interpreted the state constitution to provide
women with the fundamental right to an abortion. The court thus blocked any legislative
attempt to pass restrictive abortion regulation.' An Ohio court, in contrast, refused to
find that the Ohio Constitution provided broader protection than the Federal Constitution
provides for a woman's right to choose. 67
d. The Federal Response
For the remainder of President Bush's administration after Webster, he and Congress
battled over the abortion issue. One important change, potentially attributable to public
response to Webster, was that twenty-three House members, who supported banning both
federal and local funds just one year earlier, switched sides and voted not to ban local
funding in the Webster aftermath. 6 ' Similarly, both houses of Congress passed a Health
and Human Services-appropriations bill in the same year which allowed Medicaid
funding for abortions in cases of rape and incest. Historically, Medicaid funding for
abortions was limited to instances when the mother's life was in danger.'69 However,
when Bush vetoed both the District of Columbia appropriations bill and the Medicaid
funding bill, there was not enough support for either bill to override his veto.
The abortion issue was also prominent in Bush's unsuccessful campaign for
reelection.' 0 Within days of entering office, President Clinton-an open advocate of
choice-issued three memoranda to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
regarding abortion rights, providing for fewer restrictions on abortions and fetal tissue

165. Church, supra note 127, at 64.
166. States could extend more protection through their constitutions not only through explicit privacy clauses as in
Florida and California, but could also extend more privacy rights by interpreting a particular provision of the state
constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitution and/or interpreting similar language (of state and federal) in the
state more broadly because of a history of broader interpretation. See generally Wright, supra note 162 (discussing how
state courts can interpret their state constitutions to protect more abortion rights).
167. See Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
168. While pro-choice political response was evident in Congress after Webster, President Bush's pro-life stance
prevented any changes in federal funding of abortions. After Webster, Congress defeated a bill that would restrict the
District of Columbia's budget for abortion for the first time since Ronald Reagan was president. TRIBE, supra note 119,
at 180. In the past, Congress limited both local and federal funds that supported abortion in the District of Columbia;
however, the proposed appropriations bill for 1990 did not put a limit on local funding. Sharon Block, Congressional
Action on Abortion: 1984-1991, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW, supra note 137, at 648, 657-58.
169. Id.at 649-52.
170. See, e.g., Laurence I. BarrettAbortion:The Issue Bush Hopes Will Go Away, TIME, July 13, 1992, at 28; Linda
Greenhouse, Abortion Rights Strategy: All or Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at Al; Anne Groer, Abortion Ruling
CouldCause Troublefor Bush in '92, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 1991, at A6; Ruth Marcus, On Supportfor Choiceand
Limits. Bush-Clinton ContrastsAre Sharp, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at A21; Andrew Rosenthal, Presidentand GOP
Take Ai, at Abortion on Roe Anniversary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at Al; see also Neal Devins, Through the Looking
Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About Politics,94 COLUM. L. REV. 293 (1994) (book review).
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research.' 7 ' However, the issue remains politically volatile and unresolved, as
72
demonstrated by various forms of noncompliance with Clinton's pro-choice decisions.
3. Assessing the Response to Webster
The substantial response to Webster extended to lobbying, declarations of politicians'
positions, legislative proposals, enactment of statutes, and further court challenges,
including the Court's elucidation of the undue burden test in Casey. Thus, Webster
involved constitutional actors other than the Court in a continuing process of
constitutional interpretation. Did the Court's approach to the rule of measured steps
contribute to this reaction? Did it promote deference to others, at least for a temporary
period?
Five members of the Court claimed to apply the rule of measured steps in Webster. The
plurality's approach, standing alone, demonstrated the Court's weak support for Roe-it
rendered precedent unstable. This approach was not a measured step because it signaled
that a large change from precedent or directional shift in the law had occurred or was
imminent. What if the Court had overruled Roe completely in Webster rather than just
coming close to doing so? Justice Scalia urged a broad ruling which would take away
federal constitutional protection for abortion rights and transfer the abortion issue
entirely to the States. The plurality's approach is fairly equivalent in its result to Scalia's
desired result because it severely narrows Roe. The primary difference is that Scalia
wanted the federal courts completely out of the abortion dialogue. But the plurality did
not provide a new rule, and so failed to get courts out of the abortion debate. Just as the
plurality confined Roe to its exact facts, future courts would have to confine Webster to
its exact facts under the plurality's "dispute resolution" approach to the rule of measured
steps.
If instead we focus on the majority result in Webster, then Webster appears closer to
a measured step. That is, Justice O'Connor's refusal to fully retreat from Roe because she
wanted to take a measured step meant that the Court announced no clear new
constitutional principle. Her vote thus prevented a complete retreat from federal
constitutional protection for abortion rights. The resulting ambiguity in federal
constitutional law may have generated the substantial public response described above.
The decision invigorated pro-choice voters and spurred some formerly neutral politicians
to make clear their positions on abortion regulation.
Moreover, the ambiguous state of constitutional law produced by Webster allowed time
for gradual development of the law. Over time, the Court could listen to the response
Webster generated. Other courts could consider new legislation and new fact patterns

171. President's Memorandum on Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 87 (Jan.
22, 1993); President's Memorandum on the Title X "Gag Rule," 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 87-88 (Jan. 22, 1993);
President's Memorandum on Importation ofRU-486, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 89 (JAN. 22,1993); see also Clinton
Lifts And-Abortion Measures. LEGAL INTELLINGENCER, Jan. 25, 1993, at 5 (reporting that Clinton fulfilled campaign
promise by lifting the Bush administration ban on abortion counseling at federally funded clinics); Karen Tumulty &
Marlene Cimons, ClintonRevokesAbortion Curbs,LA. TIMES, Jan. 23,1993, at Al (reporting that Clinton lifted abortion
counseling ban on his third day in office); cf Helen Dewar, Bush's Veto Power Stalled the Abortion-RightsPush in
Congress,WASH. POST, Nov. 30,1991, at A6 (explaining that although the abortion-rights advocates made unprecedented

gains in Congress in 1991, they were often stopped short of victory because they were unable to muster the two-thirds
majority necessary to override President Bush's veto).
172. See, eg, Ohio IgnoresAbortion Policy,CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 7, 1994, at 7B; Karen Tumulty, 11

States to Defy ClintonAbortion FundingRules, LA. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at Al.
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before the Court had to resolve the next major abortion challenge. During that time,
Justice Kennedy's vote changed and Justice Souter joined the Court. The Court then
reaffirmed the core of Roe in Casey.
Thus, one critical effect of Webster was that it was perceived by some as signaling a
transfer or sharing of power on an important and sensitive constitutional issue from the
Court to others, although not signaling a complete abdication of the Court's role in the
debate. The participation of these others had not previously been completely foreclosed
by Roe. Active pro-choice and pro-life forces existed before Webster. But the perception
of who held significant power in the debate and who could influence constitutional law
development appears to have shifted as a result of Webster." For example, at the annual
summer meeting of the National Conference of State Legislatures in 1990, abortion
legislation and the recent Webster decision were a significant issue. Many legislators,
however, did not want to deal with the issue. One official said, "I really resent the fact
that the Supreme Court dumped this whole issue back on the states."'74 Another legislator
said: "The vast majority of legislators don't want to deal with the issue. They want to stay
away from it. That's a political fact.""' Prior to Webster, elected officials could more
credibly tell their constituents that the Court's ruling in Roe foreclosed other possibilities,
thereby evading shared responsibility for debating the constitutional issue with the Court.
Thus, nonjudicial political capacity for response may not have been as dwarfed by Roe
as some claim.,
The rule of measured steps aims to avoid broad rulings which might foreclose dialogue
or at least make the responses of others less authoritative.," Justice Ginsburg recently
advocated a judicial approach closely resembling the rule of measured constitutional
steps. 7 She critiqued the Court's decision in Roe in part because a more "moderate and

173. Cass Sunstein calls the public reaction to Webster "extraordinary" and suggests that the Court's "partial retreat
[from Roe] may well have galvanized the women's movement in a way that will have more favorable and fundamental
long-term consequences for sexual equali' than anything that could have come from the Supreme Court." SUNSTIN,
supranote 25, at 147.
174. State Legislatures:Abortion a Focusof Annual Meeting, ABORTION REP., Aug. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ARCNWS File (quoting Representative Kelly Shockman of North Dakota).
175. Id. (quoting Senator John Schneider of Missouri). Thus, court rulings may sometimes serve as political cover
for politicians who can implement legal rulings under protest, or use court rulings to pressure other actors. ROSENBERG,
supra note 101, at 34.
176. Cass Sunstein says Roe
probably contributed to the creation of the "moral majority"; helped defeat the Equal Rights Amendment; prevented
the eventual achievement of consensual solutions to the abortion problem; and severely undermined the women's
movement, by defining that movement in terms of the single issue of abortion, by spurring and organizing
opposition, and by demobilizing potential adherents.
SUNSTEIN, supranote 25, at 147. Gerald Rosenberg argues for the importance of economic and other factors in bringing
about abortion reform and other significant social reform. The Court, through its rulings, merely recognizes social
revolution already in progress. ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 179-80. Regarding the legality of abortion access, he
describes as important the role of Presidents Johnson, Carter, and Reagan, positions taken by the American Law Institute
and American Medical Association, and the growth of private reproductive health care clinics. Id. at 176-234.
177. Professor Thayer warned that frequent resort to courts could "dwarf the political capacity of the people." JAMES
B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901); see also SUNTEiN, supranote 25, at 145 (overreliance on courts can foreclose
response of other actors and allow others not to take their constitutional responsibilities seriously).
178. She does not directly discuss the avoidance doctrine and the only reference to the rule found in her New York
University lecture is an indirect one. Ginsburg urges the Justices to speak in more collegial and unified terms. She cites
as an example of a less than collegial remark Justice Scalia's condemnation of Justice O'Connor's reliance on the rule of
measured steps when she urged the Court in Webster to avoid reconsideration of Roe. Justice Scalia asserted that
O'Connor's assertion "cannot be taken seriously." Ginsburg, supranote 4, at 1195 n.51.
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restrained" approach would have afforded more deference to other constitutional actors.'7
She characterized the federal courts as participating "in a dialogue with other organs of
government, and with the people as well."' 80 But Ginsburg viewed Roe as "invit[ing] no
dialogue with legislators,"'' contrasting the Roe ruling with "the Court's more cautious
dispositions, contemporaneous with Roe, in cases involving explicitly sex-based
classifications."'8 In Roe, as in the Lochner era, she saw the Court as stepping "boldly
in front of the political process," resulting in outcries against the judiciary and exposing
its "precarious position as final arbiter of constitutional questions.""' 3 Thus, Ginsburg
relies in part on deference to others and in part on the Court's fragile political viability
as an institutional justification for measured constitutional steps.
Frankfurter and Bickel shared her concern for preservation of the Court's political
credibility and used that concern as a primary justification for narrow constitutional
rulings. They warned that the Court should wait until a decision is more politically
acceptable and should allow some issues to simmer so that gradual acceptance can be
built;"4 conceivably Bickel and Frankfurter extended or at least magnified the importance
of that justification for constitutional avoidance. Brandeis, for example, advocated the
most caution when a federal court was considering invalidating legislation, hoping to
avoid direct collisions with the more political branches.' He demonstrated less hesitancy
in deciding broader constitutional issues when the Court was not reviewing legislation." 6
Ginsburg recognizes some drawbacks in deferring too extensively to the more political
branches and thus makes an exception to her measured judicial approach. She would
sometimes find it acceptable for the Supreme Court to "step ahead of the political
branches in pursuit of a constitutional precept," citing Brown as the paradigmatic
example." 7 Her other example is the legislative reapportionment cases of the early 1960's
when the "Court confront[ed] blocked political processes."'8 She reasons that those

179. The effective jurist "speaks in a 'moderate and restrained' voice, engaging in a dialogue with, not a diatribe
against, co-equal departments of govemment, state authorities, and even her own colleagues." Id at 1186 (footnote
omitted) (quoting Brainerd Currie, The DisinterestedThirdState, 28 LAW & CONTEP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963)).
For Roe, she maintains that the Court could have declared the "extreme" Texas criminal statute in Roe unconstitutional
without proceeding to "fashion a regime blanketing the subject, a set of rules that displaced virtually every state law then
in force." Id at 1199. For example, in the sex-based classification cases, the Court "did not utterly condemn the
legislature's product Instead, the Court, in effect, opened a dialogue with the political branches of government. In essence,
the Court instructed Congress and state legislatures: rethink ancient positions on these questions."Id at 1204.
180. Id. at 1198.
181. Id at 1205; see also BURT, supranote 102, at 357-62 (stating that Roe directed pro-choice advocates away from
legislative reform efforts, imposed silence and allowed dialogue only in the shadow of the Justices); MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 42-43 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court "could have
authorized the states, within broad limits, to work out legislation which would have treated the abortion question in all its
complexity and with the gravity it deserves').
182. Ginsburg, supranote 4, at 1198; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy andEquality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REV. 375, 376 (1985) (stating that while the "Court's gender classification decision
overturning state and federal legislation, in the main, have not provoked large controversy," Roe "became and remains
a storm center'). She reasons that those gender-based classification cases, many of which she litigated, extended benefits
already authorized by Congress to others. Thus, the Court in a sense allowed Congress to lead. The Court "wrote modestly,
it put forward no grand philosophy" but "the Court helped to ensure that laws and regulations would 'catch up with a
changed world.'" Ginsburg, supranote 4, at 1204-05 (quoting Wendy W. Williams, Sex Discrimination:Closing the Law's
GenderGap,in THEBURGERYEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS INTHE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986, at 109, 123 (Herman
Schwartz ed., 1987)).
183. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1206; see also SUNSTEiN, supranote 25, at 147 (calling the effectiveness of Roe
"limited, largely because of its judicial source').
184. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1036-42.
185. Id at 1049-53.
186. Id. at 1050-52.
187. Ginsburg, supranote 4, at 1206.
188. Id at 1207 n.143 (referring to Baker'v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
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situations presented the Court with constitutional protections for nonmajoritarian
concerns, where prospects for political change were slow or perhaps impossible." 9 In
general, however, she urges the Supreme Court to follow, not lead, in societal changes. 90
Webster demonstrates why any analysis of the impact of measured steps must be
context-specific. In the abortion context, it is likely that both broad and narrow
constitutional rulings lead to intense response. Regardless of the rule of measured steps,
Webster might have generated substantial response due to the nature of the issue rather
than to Justice O'Connor's confining the majority to a measured step. Abortion is both
particularly important for women's self-determination and morally charged."9 ' Similarly,
one could view the abortion dialogue from a more long-term perspective, beginning the
story with Roe or even with earlier privacy rulings.'92 In this view, Roe animated the
antiabortion movement. Since Roe, antiabortion forces successfully secured restrictive
waiting periods and consent requirements, as well as limitations on public funding for
abortion.
Justice Ginsburg posits that a narrower ruling might have prevented or lessened the
twenty-year controversy ensuing from Roe. 93 If the Court had not intervened in such a
heavy-handed manner, progressive legislative efforts liberalizing abortion statutes might
have continued.' 91 Instead, "[t]he sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the
mobilization of a'fight-to-life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state

189. '"[Wihen political avenues for redressing political problems become dead-end streets, some judicial intervention
..may be essential in order to have any effective politics."' Id. at 1207-08 n.143 (quoting ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLTICS 8 (1968) (emphasis in original)).
190. O'Connor states:
With prestige to persuade, but not physical power to enforce, with a will for self-preservation and the
knowledge that they are not "a bevy of Platonic Guardians," the Justices generally follow, they do not
lead, changes taking place elsewhere in society. But without taking giant strides and thereby risking a
backlash too forceful to contain, the court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a
green light for a social change.
Id. at 1208 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGH 73 (1958)).
In conclusion Ginsburg quotes Gerald Gunther where he says that the 'need to act only interstitially does not mean
relegation of judges to a trivial or mechanical role, but rather affords the most responsible room for creative, important
judicial contributions."' Id at 1209 (quoting from the address of Professor Gerald Gunther at Judge Ginsburg's investiture
as a Court of Appeals judge).
191. As Ginsburg recognized when critiquing Roe: "I do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex
discrimination theme to its medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would have been less furious. I appreciate
the intense divisions of opinion on the moral question ....Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 383; see also BOBBrrr, supra
note 23, at 164-65, 221 (discussing ethical arguments underlying many abortion decisions); SUNSTEIN, supranote 25, at
273-74. Sunstein also suggests that the reaction to Webster may differ from reaction to other Court decisions because
abortion rights could be viewed as an existing endowment threatened by Webster. Id. at 171.
192. The earlier privacy cases might be a better place to start. See, e.g., Eisenastadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Even on the issue of abortion, the Court used the avoidance doctrine to
affirm the constitutionality of an abortion statute prior to its ruling in Roe. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971);
see BURT, supranote 102, at 344-45.
193. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 376 ("Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic
criticism . . . ."); id. at 379 (noting "searing criticism of the Court, over a decade of demonstrations, a stream of
vituperative mail addressed to Justice Blackmun... annual proposals for overruling Roe by constitutional amendment,
and a variety of measures in Congress and state legislatures to contain or curtail the decision"); id. at 381 (noting
"legislatures adopted measures aimed at minimizing the impact of the 1973 rulings, including notification and consent
requirements'); see also Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1206. For another critique of Roe reflecting another aspect of the
avoidance principle, seeRichard A. Posner, What Has Pramatismto OfferLaw?, in PRAGMATISM INLAW AND SOCIETY
29, 29 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
194. Ginsburg, supranote 182, at 379-80. "The political process was moving in the early 1970's, not swiftly enough
for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial
intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict." Id.at 385-86; see also Ginsburg,
spra note 4,at 1205-06.
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legislatures."'" Again, Roe did not foreclose dialogue completely. However, one central
difference between Roe and Webster is that the majority in Webster used the rule of
measured steps-to signal that the Court intended to limit its role in the abortion dialogue.
Although the majority did not remove the federal courts from reviewing abortion
legislation, the majority indicated that it would be more deferential to legislators than the
Roe scheme envisioned. And O'Connor used the rule to proceed slowly. Rather than
pronouncing a clear principle with which to review abortion legislation, the Court left the
law in a state of ambiguity. Use of the rule of measured steps in Webster thus forced other
constitutional actors to be more active participants in the development of abortion law.
Each person's analysis of Webster's promotion of deference and gradualism will be
influenced by whether she likes its outcome on the merits. The dissenters argued in
Webster that the plurality opinion decimated Roe by transferring or sharing with the
political branches responsibility for determining protection for abortion rights. The
political branches are sometimes deficient in protecting liberty interests, particularly
when those who need the protection are not adequately represented in the political
process. 96 For example, Ginsburg acknowledged that (due to Court interpretations
upholding public funding restrictions on abortion) for poor women, "a group in which
minorities are disproportionately represented, access to abortion is not markedly different
from what it was in pre-Roe days." 197 Even if women as a monolithic group are politically
well-represented, a smaller subset of women is capable of becoming pregnant and
desiring access to abortion at any given time. Professors Susan Estrich and Kathleen
Sullivan argue that abortion is a fundamental right which should not be left to the
political process. ' 9 Moreover, abortion is an intimate right-indeed, a privacy right-and
one filled with moral difficulty for some individuals."9 It may be difficult, even for some
who support the right, to champion the right in public, political activity. One
disadvantage of measured rulings-the resultant lack of national uniformity when the
Supreme Court fails to give broad protection for a constitutional right or provide a clear
statement on a constitutional issue-thus seems particularly problematic for abortion
rights.

195. Ginsburg, supranote 182, at 381. "Both the pro-life and anti-busing movements began in reaction to decisions
of the Supreme Court. Both activated many people who previously had been at the periphery of... politics." Id at 386
n.82. Burt describes how Roe provoked the Catholic Church to intervene aggressively in the debate. BURT, supranote 102,
at 344-47.
196. Estrich & Sullivan, supranote 56; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 75 (1980) (discussing stricter judicial scrutiny for enactments that adversely affect groups lacking political
strength); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST- A THEORY OF JUDICIAL.
REVIEw 135 (1980) (stating that the
Court's role in protecting minorities should extend beyond removing barriers to participation in the political process).
Thus, Professor West argues that the undue burden test adopted by the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Court. 2791 (1992), is unjust at this juncture, when social conditions for motherhood are not just. Robin L. West, The
Nature ofthe Right to anAbortion A Commentary on ProfessorBrownstein'sAnalysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 961,

966-67 (1994).
197. Ginsburg, supranote 182, at 377; see SUNSTEIN, supranote 25, at 147, 278.
198. Writing before Casey, they reasoned that "[t]he very essence of a fundamental right is that it 'depend[s] on the
outcome of no elections."' Estrich & Sullivan, supranote 56, at 151 (second alteration in original) (quoting West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Chief Justice Rehnquist in Webster indicates that people should rely
on state legislatures to protect themselves from restrictions on abortion. Estrich and Sullivan, however, point out that he
ignores that an overwhelming majority of those in state legislatures are "biologically exempt from the penalties they are
imposing."Id at 152.
199. Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching andthe Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" andtheLaw, 13 NOVA L.
REV. 355,371-74 (1989) (calling the discourse on abortion incomplete, both because of Roe's medical-legal framework
and because the pro-choice movement has fhiled to recognize the violence incident to abortion).
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Another disadvantage in allowing legislators to dominate the constitutional debate
about abortion is that the political branches sometimes provide a cumbersome, impeded,
ineffective process for resolving constitutional issues. Note that the vast majority of
20
legislation proposed after Webster, both pro-choice and pro-life, was not enacted.
Moreover, to the extent that the abortion issue dominated electoral politics after Webster,
politicians, candidates, organizations, and individuals may have been distracted from
effectively dealing with, or even debating, other important issues.20 ' Abortion positions
became a litmus test for many political candidates; those positions were used as shorthand political indicators of a candidate's views on multiple issues, regardless of
22
accuracy.
Applying Justice Ginsburg's approach to broad rulings is helpful but remains complex.
In my estimation, Roe presented an instance in which the Court justifiably took the lead
in developing constitutional protection for abortion rights. Because it was the Court's
first enunciation of this fundamental right, a strong statement of federal protection was
necessary for symbolic import. It served a signaling function and promoted quick and
nationally uniform protection of a federal right. Roe was effective in quickly protecting
constitutional rights and can be seen as a desirable contrast to the Court's more measured,
gradual approach to providing a desegregation remedy in Brown I12 3
In many contexts, agreement on what issues are truly nonmajoritarian and when the
political process is failing \Will not be easy to reach. Courts must draw those difficult
distinctions as they apply the rule of measured steps. Gradualism and respect for
maximizing deference to other decisionmakers is not appropriate when other
decisionmakers will not allow full participation in constitutional dialogue or have
blocked access to the dialogue. In each context, courts should consider whether they must
address constitutional issues to provide guidance, promote uniform and speedy federal
protection of rights, and advance more effective remedies.
4. Conclusion
Determining whether the rule of measured steps promotes deference and gradualism
in the abortion context depends on the definition of measuredness chosen or emphasized.
The plurality approach to the rule in Webster was not a measured step to the extent that
it severely limited precedent. The majority result advanced gradualism in that some part
of Roe was preserved in Webster and then reaffirmed in Casey due to O'Connor's reliance
on the rule of measured steps. And Webster promoted a temporary kind of deference in
which other potential participants perceived that they could influence the constitutional
dialogue on abortion.
In sum, Webster was significant because interested observers and potential dialogic
participants saw it as an indication that the Supreme Court was stepping away from
having the last word on abortion rights.20 4 The responsibility for construing how much

200. See suprapart IV.A.2.c.
201. Interview with David B. Frohnmayer (May 13,1994), supranote 123.
202. Interview with David B. Frohnmayer (Aug. 22, 1995), supranote 124.
203. See Harris, supranote 19, and sources cited supranote 19 on the ineffectiveness of the remedies in Brown 11.
204. See FiSH-R, supranote 99, at 275. Fisher writes:

Each decision by a court is subject to scrutiny and rejection by private citizens and public officials. What
is "final" at one stage of our political development may be reopened at some later date, leading to
revisions, fresh interpretations, and reversals of Court doctrines. Through this process of interaction
among the branches, all three institutions are able to expose weaknesses, hold excesses in check, and
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protection the Constitution affords for abortion was shared with others. It bears emphasis
that the courts did not abdicate their future role in the dialogic process on the abortion
issue after Webster. The lower federal and state courts were still involved in reviewing
aspects of the legislation passed in response to Webster. And within three years of
205
Webster, the Supreme Court issued Casey, with its new undue burden test.
But measuredness is not a prerequisite for dialogue and participation by actors outside
the federal judiciary in constitutional development in every context. Even broad rulings
such as Roe can yield significant opportunities for dialogue. The dialogue was different
after Roe than after Webster-the loudest voices, participation of formerly neutral
politicians, and the extent to which the dialogue was conducted "in the shadow of the
Justices" all differed. Even if the Court had overruled Roe in Webster, it is likely that
significant dialogue would have ensued. Pro-choice voters would focus their efforts on
persuading legislators not to enact restrictive legislation; the battle would shift to fronts
other than the courts. I conclude that, at least in the abortion context, dialogue is not
dependent on the Supreme Court consistently taking measured steps. Although some
types of measured rulings might elicit more participation in dialogue, other factors are
critical for promoting dialogue-including the nature of the substantive constitutional
issue. It is not axiomatic that measured steps produce deference and nonmeasured steps
foreclose others' participation in dialogue. Courts should not equate departure from the
rule of measured steps with a total rejection of deference. Instead, they should consider
their rulings-broad or measured-as a single step in a long-term dialogue on a given
constitutional issue. Both when courts temporarily avoid constitutional issues and when
they address them, multiple, long-term opportunities for participation exist as long as the
Court and other actors do not perceive that only the Court has the last word on a given
constitutional issue.
In some circumstances, it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to dominate the
dialogue by announcing a less deferential role for the courts in a particular substantive
context. Justice Ginsburg approves of the Court having done so in Brown. Similarly, I
view the Court's broad statement in Roe as appropriate to protect a newly recognized
fundamental right. Yet, even those bold steps did not completely foreclose long-term
dialogue on racial classifications and abortion regulation. This Article revisits these
conclusions after examining the other primary advantage supporting measured
constitutional rulings: the promotion of gradualism in constitutional law.
B. Gradualismin Developing ConstitutionalLaw
In addition to justifying the rule of measured steps because it may promote deference
to other constitutional interpreters, Supreme Court Justices have claimed that the rule
promotes more gradual development of, and stability in, constitutional law. This Article
contends, however, that sometimes the opposite is true-measured steps can result in less
stability in constitutional law.

gradually forge a consensus on constitutional issues. Also through that process, the public has an
opportunity to add a legitimacy and a meaning to what might otherwise be an alien and short-lived

document.
Id.
205. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In Casey, gender equality issues surfaced for the first time
as a significant concern for several Justices. Thus, maybe the terms of the debate are evolving. See SuNsTaN, supra note
25, at 283-84.
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The gradualism justification for the rule of measured steps is predicated on several
principles. First, measured steps promote "orderly development" of the law's content and
keep constitutional law from being "confused."2" 6 Second, measured steps may make
federal courts' decisions more palatable because the pace of change in constitutional law
will be controlled. 20 7 1 argue, however, that this type of concern for the courts' political
viability is misplaced; it is less significant than the first principle of gradualism.
Specifically, when federal courts focus excessively on political viability concerns, they
neglect their role in protecting constitutional values. Because Justice Scalia's factors
address both aspects of gradualism, in this Part I will critique the factors he deems
important in applying the rule of measured steps.
The several components of gradualism will be in tension at times. When the Supreme
Court chooses to move gradually and deferentially in an area of law, there is likely to be
less uniformity because many issues are not "resolved" by the Court. For example, in an
effort to move at a measured pace, the Court in Webster left significant ambiguity in the
content of constitutional law, thereby undercutting stability. The varied aspects of
measuredness must be considered when the gradualism justification is invoked. For
example, I argue that the Webster plurality did not promote gradualism. Instead, it used
a "dispute resolution" approach to the rule of measured steps which greatly devalued
precedent. Only O'Connor's attempt to retain some precedential value for Roe by relying
on the rule of measured steps made the majority result measured in this respect, and
thereby advanced gradualism.
1. Elements of Gradualism
In Webster, Justice Scalia set forth a five-factored approach to measured steps which
encourages the Supreme Court to depart from the rule when "good cause" exists. First,
Scalia noted that the rule normally "avoids throwing settled law into confusion."10 If the
content of constitutional law changes in a gradual manner, constitutional law is more
stable and uniform.2" The concern for promoting uniformity in federal constitutional law
is grounded on a fairness principle: like cases should be decided alike. 10 Uniformity also
promotes people's reliance interests-people can gauge their conduct by past

206. The concurring justices in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726,756 (1978), deemed "ordedy development"
of the law important, and Justice Scalia recognized in Webster that the rule "avoids throwing settled law into confusion,"

492 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
207. For example, Justice Ginsburg criticizes Roe as resting on "[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped." Ginsburg, supra
note 4, at 1198; see ROSENBERG, supranote 101, at 11-12.
208. Webster, 492 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
209. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Lany Kramer, Definingthe Role of the FederalCourts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67,7274 (citing potential problems with proliferation of differing trial court opinions and weakened appellate review); Richard
A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, ProceduralCommon Law, FederalJurisdictionalPolicy, andAbandonment of the
Adequate andIndependent State GroundsDoctrine, 86 CoLum. L. REv. 1291, 1292-94 (1986) (critiquing the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine).

210. The Court has emphasized the value in creating a uniform body of federal law in Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 631-32 (1874), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). See also MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NAnON UNDER LAWYERS 167 (1994) (attributing current uniformity problems in part to legislatures and
administrators who "leave it up to judges to make some sense of a welter of federal, state, and local enactments that are
often conflicting or overlapping-some overly detailed, others airily vague"). Indeed, the Federal Judicial Conference's
Committee on Long Range Planning has proposed new limits on access to federal courts, citing in part the need to maintain
coherence and consistency in federal court decisions and to prevent federal law from becoming 'Babel." Robert Pear,
JudgesProposingto NarrowAccess to Federal Court,N.Y. nMS, Dec. 5, 1994, at Al, B9 (citing report of Committee
on Long Range Planning).
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constitutional rulings. 21 ' In contrast, Scalia argued that using the rule to preserve Roe
would not promote stability, but would preserve only "chaos" in the area of abortion
regulation. If measured rulings truly promote stability in the content of constitutional
law, how does a judge determine when preserving the status quo constitutes preserving
only chaos, as Scalia concluded in Webster? A sufficient number of Justices could agree
that a given constitutional rule is confusing or chaotic. Then they could develop a
standard allowing them to issue a changed constitutional framework or principle when
the prior constitutional rule becomes "unworkable" or "unsound." 12 Using any such
flexible measure, however, presents a "five-vote problem" at the Supreme Court. Five
jurists' votes on the merits of the current constitutional rule will directly influence
213
whether the old rule is "unsound.1
Thinking about stare decisis and its close link to the rule of measured steps can
certainly inform this inquiry.214 The plurality in Webster recognized that the Supreme
Court is less bound by stare decisis in constitutional adjudication because the Court leads
in making constitutional changes." 5 This principle directly undercuts the stability the rule
of measured steps seeks to promote. Only three years after Webster, the Justices engaged
in an intensive debate about stare decisis in another major abortion ruling, Planned
Parenthoodv.Casey.2"6 Indeed, Scalia's flexible approach to the rule of measured steps
in Webster was a prelude to the elaboration of his views on stare decisis in Casey, where
21 7
he showed more willingness than other Justices to depart from constitutional precedent.
Scalia's "chaos" standard would present a magnified problem if it were to be adopted
by the lower federal courts or state courts, which issue most constitutional rulings
today.2 If each trial judge and appellate tribunal were to determine when a current
constitutional rule is "unsound" or the current framework has become "chaotic," stability
in federal constitutional law might decrease. In a related context, Professor Evan

211. See. e.g., Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[I]n most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right");Murdock, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) at 632 (giving as ajustification for appellate review of federal questions the reliance interests of citizens); Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (citing the "importance, and even necessity ofuniformity' in
federal constitutional interpretation (emphasis in original)); see also BENIAMIN N. CARDOZO, T1E PARADOXES OF LEGAL
SCIENCE 29-30 (1928) ("The weights are constantly shifted to restore the equilibrium between precedent and justice.).
212. The plurality in Webster was willing to depart from the Roe trimester framework because it had proved "unsound
in principle and unworkable in practice."' Webster,492 U.S. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
213. In choosing which issues must be decided to resolve the case and which issues may be avoided, jurists must often
peek ahead and assess the merits of the constitutional challenge. Id at 535 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring
in thejudgment).
214. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking,
73 TEX.L. REV.1 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, V/y Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817 (1994) [hereinafter Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?]. In addition to
Caminker's articles, see Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S.CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Gary Lawson, The
Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994) (citing Lawson's earlier works); Henry
P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLuM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Frederick Schauer,
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
215. Webster, 492 U.S. at 518. Stare decisis has less force in constitutional cases, "where, save for constitutional
amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes." Id.
216. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see GLENDON, supra note 210, at 113 (referring to the Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter
plurality opinion as a "grandiose portrayal of the role of the Supreme Court in American society").
217. For commentary on the Justices' perceptions of stare decisis in Casey, see GLENDON, supranote 210, at 158;
Horwitz, supranote 72, at 71-92.
218. Justice Scalia did not propose this in Webster. He only discussed the rule of measured steps in connection with
the Supreme Court's role. Alexander Bickel addressed only the Supreme Court when extolling the passive virtues of
avoidance, noting: "[o]f course, the lower courts can act in constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial
decisionmakers only." BICKEt, supranote 25, at 198.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.71:297

Caminker suggests that we consider different rules about adhering to precedent for courts
at different levels.219 Similarly, the Supreme Court should use a flexible approach in
determining whether departure from the rule of measured steps is appropriate, weighing
competing considerations. Generally, I view departures from the rule as more appropriate
for the Supreme Court than for lower federal courts, because of the Court's unique role
in promoting uniformity and providing guidance on constitutional issues. Part V therefore
explores the symbolic function of the Court in our polity. The Court provides standards
and recognizes areas of constitutional protection. In some contexts, a broad statement
(like the one in Roe) is important to ensure uniform protection of federal rights and
interests, or to ensure access to the political process for nonmajority interests. Lower
federal courts, state courts, and other actors more appropriately implement the Court's
broad statements and standards, using measured steps to apply them to new fact
situations.
The Justices and commentators have not reached any clear consensus as to the force of
stare decisis in constitutional adjudication or the conditions for appropriate departure
from precedent." In considering justifications for the rule of measured steps, however,
it is important to note that many agree that the principle of stare decisis is of lesser force
in the constitutional context because one of the federal courts' important functions is the
development and redirection of constitutional law, sometimes at the expense of stability
in the law." Development of the law is valuable in constitutional interpretation because
222
it can make the Constitution's values meaningful and effective over time.
Justice Scalia relied upon a second factor for departing from the rule in Webster: to the
extent the Court avoided reconsidering Roe, it would retain some of Roe in its
constitutional interpretation. m He noted that the majority's decision to avoid dispensing
completely with Roe in Webster was itself a significant constitutional decision.2 24 While

219. Caminker, Why Must InferiorCourts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, supra note 214. Martha Field, in a
related context, argues that judges should determine abstention at the trial court, not the Supreme Court, level. See, e.g.,
Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977); Martha A. Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the PullmanAbstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
220. Casey 112 S. Ct. at 2808. The dissenters in Webster also urged a stronger role for stare decisis, quoting Brandeis:
"The careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for
articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged 'to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and
with facts newly ascertained."' Webster, 492 U.S. at 558 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,412
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). For a variety of commentators' views and further source references, see Symposium,
JudicialDecisioninaking Stare Decisis andConstitutionalMeaning,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994).
221. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09. But see Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that safeguarding the limited role of the federal courts vis-a-vis the majoritarian branches was more
important than giving guidance on constitutional issues in some circumstances).
222. See, e.g.. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSITunON 66-69 (1987); SUNSTEIN, supranote 25,
at 354. See generally ELY, supranote 196.
223. As Scalia stated:
The result of our vote today is that we will not reconsider that prior opinion, even if most of the Justices
think it is wrong, unless we have before us a statute that in fact contradicts it-and even then (under our
newly discovered "no-broader-than-necessary" requirement) only minor problematical aspects of Roe will
be reconsidered, unless one expects state legislatures to adopt provisions whose compliance with Roe
cannot even be argued with a straight face.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
224. As Justice Scalia noted:
Perhaps [certain] abortions cannot constitutionally be proscribed. That is surely an arguable question,
the question that reconsideration of Roe v. Wade entails. But what is not at all arguable, it seems to me,
is that we should decide now and not insist that we be run into a comer before we grudgingly yield up
ourjudgment. The only sound reason for the latter course is to prevent a change in the law-but to think
that desirable begs the question to be decided.
Id.at 535.
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Brandeis would have welcomed avoidance because he believed that one of the most
important functions of the Court is avoiding "unnecessary" constitutional questions,
Scalia concluded that avoidance was the least responsible course in Webster.2 5 With his
second factor, Scalia makes a critical point: the choice to use the rule to avoid a broader
issue is itself an exercise of power and a form of constitutional interpretation. 226 It retains
the Court's prior ruling as the status quo.
Justice Scalia's first two factors for applying a flexible rule of measured steps correlate
with the first principle of gradualism, which is concerned with changing the status quo
slowly so as to preserve a stable content in constitutional law. His other three factors
correlate more closely with the second principle of gradualism, which is concerned with
maintaining a slow pace of change in constitutional law in order to make changes more
palatable. Measured changes purportedly will find the widespread public acceptance
which does not attach to sudden or haphazard shifts in constitutional law. When the
groundwork has been carefully laid in prior decisions for redirection or development of
227
the law, the Supreme Court's credibility arguably is preserved.
These arguments about the federal courts' political viability are not espoused only by
the politically "conservative" Justices. Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Ginsburg-the more
politically "liberal" Justices-have also emphasized avoiding constitutional rulings in
order to escape political entanglements. As noted earlier, they applauded avoidance and
measured rulings because they worried about the countermajoritarian difficulty and
believed that one of the primary functions for the federal courts was to safeguard their
limited judicial power. By doing so, federal courts preserved their political viability and
respected the powers of other federal branches as well as the states." s Similarly, Scalia
advocated a broader ruling in Webster to remove the courts from the political arena of
abortion decisions. This second principle of gradualism is based on federalism and
separation of powers concerns. When the federal courts protect the spheres of the other
branches and the states, they also protect their own political capital.
Thus, Justice Scalia's other factors ask whether an issue can be classified as a political
issue that is best handled by the majoritarian branches. 229 Scalia classified abortion as a
political issue which distorted the public perception of the Supreme Court's role. With
a broad ruling, he sought to ensure that federal courts would in the future avoid the
abortion issue entirely. Consideration of "political" questions do "great damage" to the
Court by "mak[ing] it the object of the sort of organized public pressure that political

225. Justice Scaia concluded his opinion in Webster.
Of the four courses we might have chosen today-to reaffirm Roe, to overrule it explicitly, to overrule
it sub silentio, or to avoid the question-the last is the least responsible.... I concur in the judgment of
the Court and strongly dissent from the manner in which it has been reached.
Id. at 537.
226. See Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 385 n.81 ('These people would never understand that if we held the law
constitutional, we would not be finding it good.'" (quoting Judge Henry J. Friendly, Address at New York University
School of Law, Some Equal Protection Problems of the 1970's 14-15 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)));
Gunther, supra note 2, at 7-8.

227. Bickel praised techniques such as the avoidance doctrine precisely because they allow the Court to control the
timing and circumstances of its ultimate constitutional pronouncements. To borrow Bickel's phrase, the Court might
"reflect out loud.., without as yet assuming responsibility" for the constitutional pronouncement. BICKEL, supra note
25, at 176, 240.
228. Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1012-17,1035-65; see supratext accompanying notes 178-90 (discussing Justice
Ginsburg's views on the issue of the federal court's political viability and respect for other branches).
229. "Alone sufficient to justify a broad holding is the fact that our retaining control, through Roe, of what I believe

to be, and many of our citizens recognize to be, a political issue, continuously distorts the public perception of the role
of this Court" Webster, 492 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
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institutions in a democracy ought to receive.""5 Scalia also voiced a federalism concern,
which is linked to his view of the merits of the abortion issue. He argued that a broader
ruling in Webster would signal to the states that, in his opinion, they have constitutional
power to restrict abortion beyond that previously recognized by the Court."'
Despite these reservations, there is less justification for using the rule of measured
steps as a separate barrier to constitutional rulings based on political classifications of
issues, because the political question doctrine and other highly developed justiciability
doctrines sufficiently address Scalia's concerns.Y2 Additionally, the political viability
arguments are not as weighty as other justifications for avoidance of constitutional issues.
I have previously argued that concern for federal courts' credibility is a less weighty
justification than promotion of deference because courts are not extremely fragile, they
are not clearly exposed to greater danger by constitutional adjudication than by other
types of adjudication, and they should not be concerned with their own credibility at the
expense of protecting certain constitutional rights. 3 The federal courts, as well as other
constitutional actors, have a duty to be involved in deciding constitutional issues and
developing constitutional law."'
Justice Scalia's factors highlight both principles of the gradualism justification.
Although I have noted where I disagree with some of his reasoning, I agree that the rule
of measured steps must be applied in a flexible, context-based manner. The next
subsection explores the tensions between the several elements of gradualism.
2. Tensions in Preserving Gradualism
In considering whether it is taking a measured step, a court must examine the
competing principles of gradualism. When the Supreme Court chooses to move gradually
and deferentially in an area of law, there could be multiple, inconsistent applications of
constitutional law among other constitutional interpreters such as legislators, lower
federal and state courts, and executive officers enforcing laws. Even if those other
interpreters take incremental steps in applying the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution, there is likely to be less uniformity because the Court leaves many issues
unresolved. This problem may be compounded when the Supreme Court issues an
ambiguous measured ruling.
For example, the majority in Webster could not reach consensus on a clear principle
of constitutional law to replace existing law. In an effort to move at a measured pace, the
Court left significant ambiguity in the content of constitutional law, thereby undercutting
one form of stability. Moreover, the approach of the Webster plurality toward the rule of
measured steps meant that precedent only applied to the extent later challenges reflected

230. Id. at 532.
The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph ofjudicial statesmanship. It is not that, unless
it is statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper
business since the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical ....
Id.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.at 535.
Kloppenberg, sopra note I, at 1036-46.
Id. at 1042-46.
As Justice Blackmun asserted in his Webster dissent: "This Court stands as the ultimate guarantor of that zone
of privacy, regardless of the bitter disputes to which our decisions may give rise. In Roe, and our numerous cases
reaffirming Roe, we did no more than discharge our constitutional duty." Webster, 492 U.S. at 557 n.1 I (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS INTHE POLTICAL
ORDER (1991).
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something close to the precedent's exact facts and an almost identical statute or
regulation. The dissent accused the Webster plurality of evading Roe on untenable factbased differentiations between the two cases. 5 The dissenters charged that the plurality
pretended to preserve Roe, citing the rule of measured steps, but in fact overruled Roe.
That is, the plurality "modified" and "narrowed" the old rule so drastically that it created
a new rule.? 6 In this sense, as argued earlier, the plurality's approach in Webster was not
measured? 7 In a related approach, some argue that a decision of the Court imposes no
legal duties except on the parties to that case." By confining the precedent to its exact
facts, courts use measured steps to lessen the force of precedent and thus undercut
stability and predictability in the content of constitutional law.
Although I classify the plurality's "dispute resolution" approach to the rule as not
measured, it is useful to compare it to the approach in Pacifica." The Court's ruling in
Pacifica prohibited future airings of George Carlin's monologue only at the same or
closely similar times, in the same media and under similar circumstances.240 While it left
issues unresolved, Pacificadid not narrow precedent as the Webster plurality did. It dealt
with a novel situation and took a measured step to resolve only the facts presented and
allow the FCC to take the initial step in resolving the next challenge. Like the Webster
plurality, some Justices have recently construed precedent narrowly or revised precedent
in a manner that shifts protection for federal rights "backward" in several areas of racial
classification law.24! These significant shifts undercut stability and may be best classified
as nonmeasured movements.
At the other extreme from such a specific "dispute resolution" approach, broad
constitutional decisions likewise could fail to secure some legal rights by undermining
gradualism and adherence to precedent. 242 Courts should consider different types of broad
and measured rulings. For example, Justice Ginsburg has distinguished Roe from the
more open-ended Griswold ruling because the latter left more ability for others to respond
and fill in the details.2 43 Measured rulings by the Court could also promote uniformity in
federal law when the rulings are clear and the Justices are largely in consensus. Those

235. As Justice Blackmun states:
The plurality pretends that Roe survives, explaining that the facts of this case differ from those in Roe
.... The plurality repudiates every principle for which Roe stands; in good conscience, it cannot possibly
believe that Roe lies "undisturbed" merely because this case does not call upon the Court to reconsider
the Texas statute, or one like it.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 556 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see suprapart II.
236. "With feigned restraint, the plurality announces that its analysis leaves Roe 'undisturbed,' albeit 'modifqied] and
narrow[ed]"" Webster, 492 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in original)

(quoting plurality opinion).
237. See id at 542; supra part IV.A.3. Critics charge that the plurality in Webster read Roe so narrowly in order to
revise abortion law. See also Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 56; Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise-Inevitableand
Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 921,923-24.
238. For example, Bickel argued that the Court impcses legal duties only on the parties in his defense of Southern
resistance to the "School Segregation Cases." BICKEL, supranote 25, at 263-64. Daliel Farber thoroughly critiqued
Bickel's treatment of Supreme Court decisions in Daniel Fater, The Supreme Court andthe Rule ofLaw: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
239. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
240. Id at 750.
241. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995) (finding that federal affirmative action setasides must be narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling interest); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (rejecting the
Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act and finding a redistricting scheme unconstitutionally race

conscious).
242. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of LA, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
243. "Unlike Roe, Griswolddidnot purport to adopt a whole framework, complete with detailed rules and distinctions,

to govern the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would apply." Webster, 492 U.S. at 494.
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rulings could signal a stability in the direction of the law. Alternatively, the Court's
rulings could also promote uniformity by closely adhering to precedent. Although the
status quo preservation inherent in this molecular movement can be a significant problem
in some substantive areas, a measured ruling which greatly respects precedent advances
the gradualism justification for the rule.
The Supreme Court could also achieve uniformity in the content of federal law by
addressing constitutional issues broadly and by using a flexible approach to the rule of
measured steps, but urging the lower federal courts and state courts to use only measured
steps in constitutional adjudication. The state and lower federal courts could then serve
as laboratories, experimenting with implementation of the Court's broad rulings and
flexible standards in limited factual circumstances. The next Part emphasizes a
heightened role for the Supreme Court in ensuring uniformity through broader statements
which provide guidance on constitutional issues.
Although I argue -that heightened guidance and promotion of uniformity through a
flexible approach to broad rulings is most appropriate for the Supreme Court, it may
sometimes be important for other courts to employ a similar contextual approach to the
rule. The bulk of federal constitutional decisions are currently made by the lower federal
and state courts. Additionally, the Supreme Court, with its discretionary certiorari
policies and limited resources, faces only a small portion of the constitutional questions
raised in litigation. Indeed, the Court has heard a declining number of cases in recent
years. Federal circuits may have differing constitutional pronouncements on the same
issue for a considerable period of time without Supreme Court intervention. 2" State
rulings on federal constitutional issues may conflict with federal pronouncements on the
same issues.24 Lack of uniformity in constitutional decisions may be beneficial because
more measured rulings encourage experimentation with constitutional interpretation in
many forums.2 46 To the extent uniformity is important to secure fairness and promote
reliance, however, a federal appellate court may need to address the lack of uniformity
in its own circuit by issuing a broader constitutional ruling which provides guidance and
advances uniformity. The Supreme Court could still address intercircuit conflicts under
this approach. And, in some circumstances, trial courts and state courts should depart
from the rule when there is a great need for speedy and uniform protection of a federal
right. Part V develops this suggestion by exploring lower court rulings challenging the
military's ban on gay and lesbian service members.
3. Conclusion
Measured steps do not guarantee stability in constitutional law. Both measured and
broad rulings can cause upheavals in constitutional law when they signal significant
departure from precedent and generate less uniformity. Specifically, the "dispute
resolution" approach to the rule used by the Webster plurality undermines stability
because it lessens the value attached to precedent. Even if this approach to the rule
promotes some elements of gradualism, it undercuts uniformity. To balance the tensions

244. Chemerinsky & Kramer, supranote 209, at 83-85 (citing current reliance on federal courts of appeals to settle
most federal law issues).
245. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 31, § 2.6, at 142; Chemerinsky & Kramer, supranote 209, at 84.
246. Paul M. Bator, Finalityin CriminalLaw andFederalHaheasCorpusforState Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441
(1963); Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 209, at 79; Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in Staie
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (1993).
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identified above, we need to consider seriously differing roles for different courts at
different levels in terms of applying the rule and advancing its justifications. Thus, the
Supreme Court should adopt a flexible approach to the rule, balancing its justifications
in each context. In contrast, the lower federal courts and state courts should depart from
the rule more cautiously because of the potential for disrupting stability. Part V focuses
on the disadvantages of measured rulings in order to develop criteria for applying a
flexible rule of measured steps and suggests why lower level courts should sometimes use
a flexible, context-dependent approach to the rule.
V. DISADVANTAGES OF MEASURED CONSTITUTIONAL
RULINGS
The potential disadvantages of measured constitutional steps include: (1) slowness in
changing the status quo; (2) less uniformity in the content of federal constitutional law;
(3) lessened judicial guidance on constitutional issues; (4) failure to secure rights; and
(5) inefficiencies for courts, litigants, and other actors. In discussing the advantages of
measured steps in the context of abortion rights, Part IV considered many of these items.
For example, lessened judicial guidance is a tradeoff which sometimes results from courts
deferring so that other constitutional actors can lead in developing an area of law. Part
IV additionally showed how some measured rulings may advance one principle of
gradualism but produce ambiguity and weaken the uniformity of law. The slow pace of
change offered by some measured rulings can be viewed as an advantage or disadvantage,
depending on the substantive constitutional issue and depending on the viewer. This Part
first identifies the potential disadvantages which have not yet been fully described. It then
analyzes the effectiveness of measured rulings in the series of cases involving gay and
lesbian service members. As a contrast to the Webster analysis, this Part uses a series of
lower court rulings to highlight the differing ramifications of measured steps at various
court levels.
A. Canvassingthe Disadvantages
Providing guidance on constitutional issues is a preeminent function of the federal
courts, particularly the Supreme Court.24 The "lawsaying" function of the Supreme Court
dates at least back to Marbury.2" Bickel described the Court as being "engaged in an
endlessly renewed educational conversation" with other institutions as it decides
constitutional issues. 2 9 When a court focuses on one constitutional issue, and deems

247. Bobbitt calls this the Court's function in expressing values. BoBBrrr,supranote23,at 189,192-93,211,235-36;

see also ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 7-8, 25-26 (arguing that Court decisions are sometimes viewed as powerful
symbols which can place items on the political agenda and make it difficult for other actors to avoid constitutional
responsibility); Fiss,supranote 7 (describing Court's norm-articulation function); Linde, supranote 7, at 238 (describing
the symbolic role of Court rulings in "shap[ing] people's vision of their Constitution and of themselves"); Resnik, supra
note 7, at 1526-28.
248. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see Althouse, supra note 101, at 1182 n.22 (explaining that
the word "lawsaying" is derived from Marbury).
249. BICKEL, supranote 115, at Ill. Bickel writes:
The Court thus interacts with other institutions, with whom it is engaged in an endlessly renewed educational
conversation. It is a conversation that takes place when statutes are construed, when jurisdiction is defined and
perhaps declined, when the lower federal courts are addressed by the Supreme Court as their "administrative head,"
and also when large "constitutional issues" are decided. And it is a conversation, not a monologue.
1d; see alsoEugene V. Rostow, The DemocraticCharacterofJu&cialReview, 66 HARV. L.REV. 193,208 (1952) (calling
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others unnecessary to reach, it fails to give guidance on those other issues. If a hierarchy
or ranking in significance is possible for constitutional issues, a measured ruling can
neglect more important constitutional issues.2"' The Webster dissenters complained that
the plurality did not even mention, let alone reach, the more important constitutional
issue of "whether the Constitution includes an 'unenumerated' general right to
251
privacy.
Some dispute that a primary mission for the courts is giving guidance. Justice Stevens
has stated that the Justices "do not sit to expound our understanding of the Constitution
to interested listeners in the legal community; we sit to resolve disputes."" The
avoidance doctrine, based in part on the prohibition against rendering advisory opinions,
is grounded on this dispute resolution emphasis." Similarly, the strengthening in recent
decades of judicial management techniques, judicial encouragement of settlement, and
alternatives to litigation demonstrates the judiciary's heightened concern with its role in
providing efficient dispute resolution services. 21 4 A rich literature explores the tension
between these functions-of resolving private disputes and providing public guidance by
articulating constitutional values."
A court does not have to issue a broad holding to provide guidance. Courts can provide
guidance in measured rulings with clear, incremental holdings. They can provide
guidance by consistently respecting precedent, by speaking with less ambiguity, and by
issuing measured rulings which employ flexible standards for later courts to develop.
Again, the perception that others are able to respond to court rulings is critical. What the
federal courts say is not necessarily the last word on a constitutional issue: their
statements can generate further interaction.

the Supreme Court "an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar").
250. Similarly, Justice Scalia urged departure from the rule in Webster because a broad ruling would give guidance
by signaling to the states that they have constitutional power in the abortion regulation field which they could exercise.
In most cases, we do no harm by not speaking more broadly than the decision requires. Anyone affected by the
conduct that the avoided holding would have prohibited will be able to challenge it himself and have his day in court
to make the argument. Not so with respect to the harm that many States believed, pre-Roe, and many may continue
to believe, is caused by largely unrestricted abortion. That will continue to occur if the States have the constitutional
power to prohibit it, and would do so, but we skillfully avoid telling them so.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
251. Id. at 546-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1071 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the public may be unaware
of many Supreme Court decisions, or only aware in a "sound bite" level of sophistication. ROSENBERG, supra note 101,
at 16, 111.
253. Kloppenberg, supra note 1, at 1009-11.
254. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991) [hereinafter
Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation"]; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982); Erik K.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threatto the Value ofAccessible Courtsfor inorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341 (1990).
255. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Personaland ImpersonalLitigalive Forms: Reconceiving the History ofAdjudicative
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990); Resnik, Front "Cases"to "Litigation," supranote 254; Stephen C. Yeazell,
Collective Litigationas Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43.
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Although it is difficult to measure the impact of constitutional rulings, 216 they are
important in two senses: both because of their effect on the litigants and their potential
national import. At a minimum, constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court serve a
practical function of providing guidance to the extent other courts and constitutional
actors closely adhere to those precedents. The importance of constitutional issues
therefore argues for a heightened duty of the Supreme Court to decide-not
avoid-significant constitutional challenges which have ramifications beyond the
immediate dispute. 7 As noted earlier, Justice Scalia argued in Webster that the Court
should provide more guidance by clarifying the chaos of Roe, and he indicated that states
could exercise more power through a nonmeasured ruling. In contrast, Justice Stevens has
argued that the rule of measured steps should be followed most closely when courts are
asked to decide "problematic" (i.e., controversial and important) constitutional
questions."' Justice Ginsburg appears to advocate a position between those poles.
Although Justice Ginsburg praises measured motions for the federal courts, she argues
that the Supreme Court should lead when minority rights are not adequately protected by

majoritarian branches.

9

The Court has recently declined to provide constitutional law guidance in several ways.
In addition to using avoidance techniques, the current Court has almost complete
discretion in selecting which issues to hear. And the Court has used the discretionary
certiorari policy to decide a declining number of cases in recent terms. 20 Further, the

256. Justice Frankfurter argued:
It is because the exercise of the right to declare a law unconstitutional is "the most important and delicate duty of
this [C]ourt," and because that right "is not given to [the Court] ... as a body with revisory power over the action
of Congress," nor, it may be added, over the action of the forty-eight States, that this Court has from the beginning
demanded of litigants that they show in precisely what way and to what extent incursions have been made into their
federally protected rights and rules have been designed to narrow as closely as possible the issues presented by such
claims.
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 335 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911)). I have questioned whether constitutional decisions are
necessarily more important than other decisions. Kloppenberg, supranote 1, at 1036-42.
257. In Poe v. Ullman, Justice Douglas, dissenting from the Court's refusal to find the dispute regarding Connecticut's
law banning contraceptive use ripe, argued that "a sick wife, a concerned husband, a conscientious doctor seek a dignified,
discrete, orderly answer to the critical problem confronting them.... They are entitled to an answer to their predicament
here and now" 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see BICKEL, supranote 25, at 127. Scholars have
debated extensively the problem of reconciling the duty of federal courts to decide cases properly before them with
techniques such as the abstention doctrines. See, e.g., REDISII, supranote 234; Bandes, supranote 24.
258. In Berkemer v. McCarty, Justice Stevens argued:
Lamentably, this Court fails to follow the course of judicial restraint that we have set for the entire federal
judiciary. In this case, it appears the reason for reaching out to decide a question not passed upon below and
unnecessary to the judgment is that the answer to the question upon which we granted review is so clear under our
settled precedents that the majority-itsappetitefordeciding constitutionalquestions only whetted-is driven to
serve up a more delectable issue to satiate it. I had thought it clear, however, that no matter how interesting or
potentially important a determination on a question of constitutional law may be, "broad considerations of the
appropriate exercise ofludicial power prevent such determinations unless actually compelled by the litigation before
the Court." Indeed, this principle of restraint grows in importance the more problematic the constitutional issue is.
468 U.S. 420, 445-46 (1984) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Barrv. Mateo, 355 U.S. 171,172 (1957)).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
260. See, e.g., Richard Carelli, High CourtDecisionsShrinking, CLvEL.AND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 14, 1994, at 22A
(Th e Supreme Court's shrinking decision docket, a puzzling phenomenon of recent years, appears headed for a new low.
... This term, the court is on a sub-84 pace.); Alan M. Dershowitz, The High Court Shuts Out the Lowly, L.A. TtMES,
Oct. 6,1994, at B7 (noting that, out of more than 1600 petitions forreview, "the justices found not a single one worthy
of their reviewl] ... includ[ing] hundreds of criminal convictions involving defendants too poor to afford a lawyer[,].
. . a number of medical-ethics cases . . . and numerous other controversies that concern all Americans"); Linda
Greenhouse, U.S. Justices Open Their NewSession by Refusing Cases, N.Y.TMES, Oct. 4,1994, at A4 (stating that of
1600 petitions, 44 were accepted, indicating that fewer cases may be decided this session than in the record low 1993-94
term, in which only 84 eases were decided).
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problem of lessened guidance is exacerbated by the splintered opinions and close votes
among the Justices in recent terms.2 '
The Court could provide increased guidance in several ways. Congress, of course,
could require it to hear certain federal issues rather than allowing the Court great
discretion in choosing the cases it hears. Second, the Court can provide its analysis of a
constitutional challenge more quickly when a speedy resolution would be beneficial. For
example, the Court heard the term limits challenge on an expedited basis during the 199495 term.262 Additionally, Congress can control the timing of Supreme, Court review by
providing for early resolution of a constitutional challenge to a statute, as it did with the
flag burning statute." Alternatively, the Court itself could speak in a more uniform voice
and work hard to build consensus and speak in clear majorities. However, that may not
be feasible because of disagreements among the Justices on the merits of some
constitutional issues, and open disagreements may be valuable to the extent the Justices'
differing perspectives inform the constitutional debate. Finally, Congress and the federal
judiciary could explore the Article III constraints on the Supreme Court issuing some
form of advisory opinions.2"
However, there is danger in seeking guidance too readily from the Supreme Court.265
When one constantly looks to the Supreme Court to have the last word on a constitutional
issue, other constitutional actors can more plausibly avoid participating in the
constitutional dialogue. When the Court offers limited guidance-as in Webster-others
may be forced to participate more actively in debating a constitutional issue.
Additionally, measured constitutional rulings may pose harms because they leave some
claims of federal rights unresolved. Justice Frankfurter once recognized that the Court's
avoidance techniques "may result in the disadvantages and embarrassments of keeping
open doubtful questions of constitutionality." 2" These disadvantages constitute more than
just lack of guidance. Many measured rulings allow unconstitutional conduct to continue
and thus leave some constitutional rights less secure.267 This harm can extend beyond the

261. Ginsburg, supranote 4, at 1189-91. Ina practice established by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court previously
spoke in a more uniform voice, both for guidance and to lend greater credibility. Presently, the "overindulgence in separate
opinion writing may undermine both the reputation of the judiciary for judgment and the respect accorded court
dispositions. Rule of law virtues of consistency, predictability, clarity, and stability may be slighted when a court routinely
fails to act as a collegial body." ld; see also BOBBrrT, supranote 23, at 187 (describing Marshall Court); Lewis A.
Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One andthe Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13
(1993) (citing historical sources on English and American practices). Professors Korhauser and Sager offer a thoughtful
evaluation of problems of generating guidance via collegiality among differing levels of courts. Id at 42-47.
262. Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Rule on Term Limits, EUGENE REG. GUARD, June 21, 1994, at IA. The
Supreme Court took a term limits case at the first opportunity (Arkansas' appeal), whereas, at times, the Court awaits
circuit conflict before granting certiorari. This can be taken as a signal that a decision of the Supreme Court sooner rather
than later may be beneficial. In this expedited review, the Court held that the Arkansas term limits amendment violated
the Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 700(d) (1994) (providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court ofjudgments issued by a District
Court on the constitutionality of flag burning prohibition).
264. Some state courts issue advisory opinions. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIC ION § 2.2, at 43 (1989)
as construed by the Court
(discussing the Massachusetts courts' practices in a flag burning case). Although Article III
prohibits "advisory opinions," it is not clear and immutable what specifically constitutes an impermissible advisory
opinion. For example, we regard certain portions of opinions as dicta and afford those portions less precedential effect.
See generallyDorf, supranote 56.
265. BURT,supra note 102, at 353; FISHER, supra note 99, at 8; ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 338-43; SUNSTEIN,
supranote 25, at 9.
266. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 330 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
267. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS INTHE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1, 1 n.2
(1980); Bandes, supra note 24,at 319 ("[Tihe most important goal of [A]rticle III is to preserve the Court as the primary
guardian of the Constitution."); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court. 1978 Tertn-Foreword: The Forms of Justice,93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (1979); Louis L. Jaffee, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: PublicActions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
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26
immediate litigants because of the precedential effect of rulings. 1 In contrast, a
measured ruling leaves the status quo in place.
Others argue that federal courts have a special duty to protect the federal rights of
269
individuals and minorities from majoritarian resolutions of rights debates. Justice
Ginsburg's approach to measured decisionmaking reflects this vision of the federal
courts' role. Similarly, this Article urges federal courts to depart from the rule of
measured steps when necessary to protect such interests. And, as noted above, some
measured rulings may generate nonuniform protection of federal rights. Like cases, even
270
if decided simultaneously, may be treated differently by various courts. In addition to
causing instability, this generates unfairness.
Finally, some types of narrow rulings increase -the amount of litigation and delay the
securing of rights by forcing each person to litigate individually. In contrast, broader
rulings or remedies that pertain to a larger segment of people similarly situated resolve
questions for more potential litigants. From an individual autonomy perspective, it may
be beneficial to afford each person a day in court and to increase the opportunities for
participation and response between courts and other actors.2" But participation rights
may not be so valuable to all litigants because participation comes with costs. The litigant
and her story are deemphasized as the law is applied and developed by lawyers and
judges in an adversarial and hierarchical system based on rationality and abstract
reasoning." Multiple, duplicative litigation poses costs and risks not only for litigants
but for the judicial system as a whole.
This canvassing of potential harms was designed to introduce multiple effects of
measured steps without unduly repeating harms previously addressed in Part IV's
analysis of the benefits of measured steps. The remainder of this Part is more concrete,
evaluating potential problems of measured rulings through a series of cases in the lower
federal courts involving the constitutionality of the military's policy concerning sexual
orientation.

B. Effects of MeasuredRulings in LitigationInvolving Gay
and Lesbian Service Members
Recent litigation involving gay and lesbian military service members presents the
federal courts with a choice between fashioning narrow injunctions affecting only
individual litigants or broad injunctions concerning the constitutionality of the military's
ban as applied to all service members. The scope of injunctive relief in this context is
thus similar to the scope of precedent discussed earlier-an injunction applying only to
an individual service member is like the Webster plurality's "dispute resolution"
approach to Supreme Court precedent. We cannot evaluate whether measured injunctive
relief is beneficial without considering the potential harms of such rulings.

1265, 1265 (1961).
268. See Staub, 355 U.S. 313; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
269. See Bivensv. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,402-03 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 9.1.2, at 527-29.
270. See CARDOZO, supra note 211.
271. See sources cited supranote 252.
272. See, e.g., Minow, supranote 104; Judith Resnik, Rereading "The FederalCourts": Revising the Domain of
FederalCourts Jurisprudence at the Eid of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994).
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1. Meinhold v. UnitedStates Departmentof Defense
One of the early cases which has commanded significant attention was brought by V.
Keith Meinhold. 21 Meinhold publicly declared his homosexuality in May 1992 and the
Navy immediately began discharge proceedings against him.274 The trial judge initially
granted a preliminary injunction for Meinhold upon finding that the Navy had failed to
follow its own procedural regulations and that the Navy's regulations violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.27 Meinhold was reinstated pending
resolution of the case.27 The trial judge then issued a preliminary injunction forbidding
the Department of Defense ("DOD") from "discharging or denying enlistment to any
person based on sexual orientation in the absence of sexual conduct which interferes with
the military mission of the armed forces of the United States."12"
The Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction upon appeal by the DOD1 7 S The
trial judge then issued a permanent injunction barring the DOD from taking any action
against a homosexual service member based on sexual orientation, effectively nullifying
the Department's regulations in this area.2 The government appealed the judge's ruling
on the scope of the injunction immediately; the Supreme Court granted an emergency
stay of the injunction as it pertained to anyone other than Meinhold. 280 Later, when the
Ninth Circuit considered the merits of Meinhold's challenge, the court significantly
narrowed the trial court's ruling and held that the injunction was proper only to the extent
it enjoined the Navy from discharging Meinhold based on his declaration that he is a
homosexual. 281 Thus, the constitutional ruling was limited to benefit only Meinhold due
to the measured form of relief employed.
The proper scope of injunctive relief against government actors is a complicated and
unsettled area, partly because of the equitable foundations underlying injunctive relief.
As the Ninth Circuit noted when it overturned Judge Hatter's nationwide injunction in

273. The military policy which gave rise to these cases was instituted in 1981 and has forced over 16,000 armed forces
members out of service. The policy states that a homosexual may be discharged if he makes statements which indicate
a propensity to engage in homosexual behavior. Prior to the 1981 policy, a service member could be discharged only for
engaging in such conduct. Under the 1981 policy, merely being homosexual was cause enough for discharge. Katrina M.
Dewey, Conduct Unconstitutional,CAL. LAW., July 1993, at 36, 38.

274. Meinhold, one of the Navy's most talented airborne sonar analysts, was widely respected by both peers and
superior officers and was ranked among the top 10% of all Navy instmctors. Meinhold's sexual orientation was widely
known and accepted in his unit. The Navy never formally advised Meinhold that his homosexuality alone was cause for
discharge until after he had declared his orientation on a nationally televised news program. Meinhold v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1453,1454 (C.D. Cal. 1992), affd in part. vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
275. Id.
at 1454-55.
276. Id.
at 1455.
277. Id. at 1458. Judge Hatter's ruling presented a compelling and succinct argument for ending the ban on
homosexuals inthe military. The judge discussed the initial Crittenden report which found "no empirical proof" that sexual
orientation affected the ability to fislfill the military's mission; he then cited a 1988 DOD Report which found that sexual
orientation was as relevant to suitability to serve as right- or left-handedness and that homosexuals in the military were
more likely to adjust to military life successfully than heterosexuals. Additional evidence that female homosexuals were
"among the command's top professionals" supported Judge Hatter's finding that there was no rational basis for the
regulations. Finally, the judge discussed recent abdications of such bans in Canada and Australia. id at 1457-58.
278. The court held that the injunction would not harm the DOD because the Clinton administration had recently
issued a new directive, effective prior to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, calling for an end to the policy which the district court
had declared unconstitutional, and which had served as the basis for the injunction itself. Meinhold v. United States Dep't
of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
279. Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1458.
280. Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
281. Meinhold,34 F.3d at1472.
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Meinhold, courts must balance an injunction's burden on the defendant against the
effectiveness of the relief it awards the plaintiff. t 2 Because Mr. Meinhold sought relief
only on his own behalf, the court reasoned that effective relief was obtained by upholding
the injunction as to him. 2 3 The appropriate scope of injunctive relief against a
governmental defendant thus overlaps with other considerations, including whether relief
is pursued on behalf of a class, whether other aggregation techniques are available,
whether future litigants will be able to use nonmutual offensive issue preclusion to bind
the government defendant, and how future courts will respect an earlier injunction as a
matter of precedent. Because traditional equity concerns may not adequately reflect all
the considerations important when courts issue injunctions against governmental actors
involved in public law litigation,2t 4 this Article argues that the scope of injunctive relief
is a critical factor in assuring or rejecting measuredness in constitutional rulings. Thus,
this Article considers whether courts hearing challenges to the federal government's bans
against homosexual service members are able to effectively assure adequate relief by
analyzing the effects of measured injunctive relief.
2. Other Contemporaneous Litigation
Numerous other individual challenges to the military's policy were simultaneously
pending in federal courts while the government appealed Meinhold to the Ninth Circuit.
Consideration of these other rulings is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the
narrow injunction in Meinhold. In the District of Columbia Circuit, the beleaguered case
of Joseph Steffan wound its way up and down the system for six years. 5 5 In reasoning
similar to that in Meinhold, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision in
favor of the government, ordering that Steffan be reinstated with his diploma and
commission. In a rehearing en banc, a fragmented court affirmed the district court
decision, holding that Steffan's discharge and denial of his academic degree for merely
admitting his homosexuality was not unconstitutional." 6 This ruling directly contradicted
the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling in Meinhold.27
In April, 1994, a district court in New York issued a preliminary injunction for six
plaintiffs challenging the new "don't ask, don't tell" policy put in place by the Clinton

282. "An injunction 'should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.'Meinhold,34 F.3d at 1480 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
283. Id
284. See, e.g., Michael D. Axline, Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against FederalAgencies in
EnvironmentalCases, 12 HARV. ENVTL. REV. 1 (1988) (critiquing use of the traditional balancing of harms test for

awarding equitable relief in environmental citizen suits against federal agencies).
285. Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 1989), rev d and remanded,920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990), on
remand, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), revd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and
rehearingen banc granted,No. 91-5409, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9977 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 1994), affldsub noam.
Steffan
v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See Judge Wald's dissent, 41 F.3d at 697 (Wald, J., dissenting), for a lucid analysis
of the issues and procedural history.
286. Steffan, 41 F.3d 677 (onejudge concurring, two concurring in part, one concurring in part and dissenting in part,
and three dissenting). The majority focused on whether banning those who admit homosexuality has a "rational relation
to the legitimate goals" of banning homosexuals from the military. Not questioning the legitimacy of those goals, the court

treated this as a question of whether conduct can be inferred from thoughts or desires, when conduct or specific intent is
not explicitly denied. Finding this inference, the court held that Steffan failed to show that the directives were
unconstitutional as appliedto him.
287. Meinhold,34 F.3d 1469. The Ninth Circuit held that the DOD's regulation was constitutional only if it applied
to statements that actually indicated a desire or propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. The court held that in
Meinhold's case the mere statement that he was homosexual was insufficient evidence that he would in fact engage in the
prohibited conduct. But see Steffan, 41 F.3d 677.
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administration while Meinhold's challenge to the old policy was pending. 28 In analyzing
the new rule, the New York court found it similar in application to the old one and
therefore likely to be an unconstitutional violation of the plaintiffs' Fifth and First
Amendment rights. 2 9 The judge declined to enjoin the application.of the regulation to
other service members, stating that "[w]ere this a class action affecting all homosexuals
in the Services the balance of hardship analysis might be different. ' 290 The ultimate
resolution of Able on the merits bore out the court's judgment. In a decision similar in
tone and force to that of Judge Hatter in Meinhold, the trial court held two provisions of
the new rule unconstitutional, but enjoined enforcement only against the plaintiffs. 29 '
Thus, the ruling was consistent with part of the trial court's ruling and with the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in Meinhold, and the injunction was of similar scope.
Another service member, Margarethe Cammermeyer, was discharged for admitting her
homosexuality in 1989.292 The trial judge ruled in Cammermeyer's favor and reinstated
her as a National Guard Colonel in June 19 9 4.19 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit put her case
94
on hold pending the outcome of appeals in Meinhold.
Much related litigation is still pending, and the Supreme Court has not yet considered
either ban. However, what has transpired so far demonstrates that, with the measured
scope of injunctive relief ordered by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in
Meinhqld, numerous lower federal courts continued to participate in determining whether
the policies violate the Constitution. While the government appealed Meinhold, the courts
considered other factual situations and challenges to both policies on a variety of
constitutional grounds. The courts issued opinions both consistent with and contrary to
portions of Meinhold. Additionally, the courts appear to be adopting several different
standards in reviewing the military's actions concerning homosexual service members in
295
this litigation.

288. Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1045 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see infra notes 297-303 for details of the new
policy.
289. Able, 847 F. Supp. at 1041-43.
290. Id at 1045.
291. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
292. Cammermeyer was a highly respected member ofthe armed forces. In her nearly 30 years ofservice she earned
advanced degrees in nursing,was appointed to the University of San Francisco School of Nursing faculty, and received
the Bronze Star for distinguished service and other awards and distinctions for outstanding service. Prior to her discharge,
Washington Governor Booth Gardner wrote to Secretary Cheney asking that she be retained, or it "would be both a
siguificant loss to the State of Washington and a senseless end to the career of adistinguished, long-time member of the
armed services." Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 912-13 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
293. Id.
at 929. The trial judge granted Cammermeyer's motion for summary judgment on both the equal protection
and substantive due process grounds, but did not grant a summary judgment on First Amendment grounds. The judge
stated that, notwithstanding the deference given to the military and the mere rationality standard under which these types
of claims are reviewed, there is no "military exception" to the Constitution. Id. at 915 (deferring to the judgment of other
branches in the area of military affairs does not require abdication of "ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional
questions') (citing Rotskerv. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67, 69 (1981)). Applying rationality review, in light of Rotsker, the
court concluded that Cammermeyer's mere acknowledgment of her sexual orientation was unreliable evidence of a "desire
or propensity" to engage in homosexual behavior. Id. at 920.
294. Govennient Won 't Appeal Gay Sailor"S
Refttaleinent,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at A17.
295. Although the courts applied rational basis review to the military's policies on homosexuals prior to the 1990's,
the military's justifications were usually "rubber stamped" by the courts. A Ninth Circuit decision in 1991 changed this
outcome. In High Tech Gays v. Defense InihstrySecurity Clearmce Office, the court invoked active rational basis review
requiring the military to prove on the recordthat arational relationship existed between the means of the policy and the
end goal. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); see Spiro P. Fotopoulos, Note, The Beginning ofthe Endfor the Militarys
TraditionalPolicy on Hoinosexruals: Steffan v. Aspin, 29 WAKE FOREsT L.REv. 611, 636-37 (1994); see also Selland
v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1993). But see Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994), in which the military was given a presumption in favor of a rational relationship, and was
viewed with special deference.
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3. Reaction of Other Constitutional Actors
Judge Hatter's broad injunction encouraged the new Clinton administration to study
the ban on homosexual service members. The administration then recommended a new
policy while freezing all activity on discharge cases involving homosexuals except the
Meinhold litigation. President Clinton had promoted an end to the ban during his
campaign."' Clinton said that Judge Hatter's ruling in Meinhold"draws the distinction
that I seek to draw between status and conduct. ' 297 Shortly thereafter, however, under
pressure from Congress and the Pentagon, Clinton determined that an outright end to the
ban was politically impossible to achieve. The administration, faced with increasing
public pressure, sought to find a way to eliminate unconstitutional elements of the rule
while satisfying the Pentagon's concern for military order. 291 Clinton also had to contend
with the efforts of a gay rights coalition which urged the administration to construct a
new policy that targeted misconduct, not private behavior.s99
In negotiations with the DOD and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Clinton
administration did not bring the Justice Department into the dialogue until very late in
the process. The Administration made an agreement with the DOD to freeze enforcement
of the "old" ban-the one found unconstitutional by Judge Hatter and the Ninth Circuit
in Meinhold-and instead placed gay and lesbian service members on inactive reserve
pending formulation of a new policy. The new "don't ask, don't tell" policy resulting
from those negotiations appears to be substantially similar to the old policy."'
Additionally, the Justice Department on appeal in Meinhold argued that the old ban
was constitutional. The Clinton administration initially decided to discontinue contesting
other cases brought under the old policy30' and to wait instead for a challenge to its new
policy. 30 2 However, in June, 1994, the administration was still defending the old policy

296. Clinton's promise to end the ban won him wide support within the gay community during the election. However,
the day after Clinton's inauguration, Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, led a strong
opposition to this promise, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clinton tried to establish a compromise policy, and after
the Meinhold ruling stated:
The issue is whether men and women who can and have served with real distinction should be excluded from
military service solely on the basis of their status. And I believe they should not. The principle on which I base this
position is this: I believe that American citizens who want to serve their country should be able to do so unless their
conduct disqualifies them.
Chandler Burr, FriendlyFire, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54, 54-55.
297. Id. at 55.
298. For an interesting discussion on the constitutional underpinnings of the ban and a comparison between executive
and legislative authority over the militaiy, see Frank T. Pimentel, Note, The Constitutionas Chaperon:PresidentClinton's
Flirtation with Gays in the Military,20 J. LEGIS. 57 (1994).
299. The Campaign for Military Service stressed that the distinction must be "status versus misconduct" instead of
"status versus conduct" as Clinton had repeatedly stated. For a detailed account of administration negotiations and the
Campaign's efforts, see Burr, supranote 296, at 57-58.
300. U.S. Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick argues that the new policy is better than if Clinton had issued a
presidential order to lift the ban which would then have been reversed by Congress. At least, Gorelick says, a "small zone
of privacy" has been created which represents an attempt to make incremental improvements for gays in the military. Id

at 100.
301. David G. SavageAdininstrationSlow to Pick Gays-in-Service Case to Defend, LA. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1994, at AS.
302. The new policy states:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense if one or more of the following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures
set forth in such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a
homosexual act ....
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless
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in court, apparently fearing that its ability to implement the new policy would be impeded
by judicial findings that the old policy was unconstitutional." 3 Unconfirmed reports
indicate that the Justice Department has decided not to pursue any further litigation under
the old policy, and the government did not in fact appeal Meinhold to the Supreme
Court."' Clinton must now pursue enforcement of the new policy although many of the
same or similar constitutional questions remain. 05 Although it has discretion in choosing
cases to appeal, the government will almost surely appeal the recent decision in Able0 6
holding the new policy unconstitutional. The course of that litigation will show how
aggressively Clinton plans to enforce the ban.
Other litigants also have opportunities to influence the ongoing public debate through
litigation strategy. Challenges to the bans are often orchestrated by interest groups so that
people with stellar military careers are selected to challenge the bans in order to present
the best possible factual challenges. 0 7 Judges in several military ban cases called the
service member litigants "remarkable" and "exceptional.""3 The military also has the
opportunity to consider carefully its application of the new policy. In light of Meinhold,
it too could become entangled in inconsistent court decisions, making administration of
the policy difficult and uneven. For example, in December, 1994, the Navy Board of
Inquiry, applying the new "don't ask, don't tell" policy, found that Zoe Dunning, who
had stated that she was a lesbian, should not be separated from the service." ° The Board
agreed with Dunning's attorney that such a statement did not indicate an intent to practice
homosexuality."
Thus, in light of Meinhold and concerns about the potential
unconstitutionality of the new policy, the military may be avoiding fully defending the
new policy.
In sum, numerous actors had the opportunity to participate in and influence the courts'
actions on bans, and many participated actively. In response to court rulings, negotiations
ensued between executive officials, legislative members, and administrators, and public
debate over the military's policy appeared to increase significantly as a result of the
Clinton administration's maneuvering after the election and the decision in Meinhold.
Congress held hearings, and interest groups reflecting a wide spectrum of opinions about
the ban voiced their views to members of Congress and the Clinton administration.

there is a futher finding, made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations,
that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in,
attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts ....
10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
303. Bradley Graham, U.S. Shields NewMilitary-3ay Policy by Backing Old Erpulsions in Court, WASH. POST, June
22, 1994, atA7.
304. Government Won't Appeal Gay Sailor's Reinstatement, supra note 294, at A17.
305. Id In a related matter, the Justice Department chose not to file an amicus brief in another discrimination case,
in which a lower federal court found unconstitutional a 1993 citizen's initiative passed in Cincinnati prohibiting the city
from providing any type of "preferential treatment" to homosexuals. Viveca Novak, Administration, in First Test Since
Election, Decides Not to File Brief in Gay-Rights Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at A20. Six months later, in a similar
case regarding a Colorado initiative, the Justice Department again chose not to file an amicus brief. John F. Harris, U.S.
Refuses to Join Gay Rights Test Case: Clinton Backs Reno on Colorado Amendment; Activists Are Angry, WASH. POST,
June 9, 1995, at A3.
306. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
307. Amelia Craig, StaffAttoreey, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Address at the University of Oregon
School of Law (Nov. 24, 1994).
308. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Cammenneyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910,912 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
309. Navy BoardB'icks Lesbian, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1994, at A14.
310. Id.
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3
Pollsters measured changing levels of support for the ban, ' talk shows featured the
issue, and a television movie on a major network recently recounted the career and
12
litigation efforts of Margarethe Cammermeyer.

4. Evaluation of Litigation Challenging the Ban
The narrowing of Judge Hatter's Fifth Amendment ruling by the appellate courts to
concern only Meinhold typified the extremely narrow approach of the Webster plurality
to the rule of measured steps. Like Webster, this approach may have promoted deference
and a gradual rate of change in constitutional law. The executive branch officials could
respond to the judge's order by revising their future conduct regarding other service
personnel to conform to the judge's ruling; or they could continue to challenge his ruling
in litigation related to other service personnel, as has happened. With this approach,
numerous constitutional actors-members of other federal branches, the military, other
courts, litigants, interest groups, the press and public- have been engaged in an ongoing
public dialogue about the military's policy.
As with the issue of abortion rights, maybe this example is aberrant or unusual because
it is such a controversial, morally charged, and intimate issue. Any series of lower court
rulings-whether measured or broad-concerning the issue of the ban's constitutionality
would probably garner significant public attention and generate significant response.
Measured relief is thus not a prerequisite to continued debate on such an issue.
The Meinhold approach furthers a particular dialogic role for the Supreme Court as the
ultimate arbiter of constitutional issues." 3 The Meinhold approach yields multiple
interpretations by lower courts, which the Supreme Court can consider when it addresses
the issue. The deference and gradualism justifications are partly based on the idea that
there is value in "laboratories" which experiment with solutions and allow for percolation
of approaches to constitutional problems. Multiple decisions by lower courts might thus
enhance the thoughtfulness of the Supreme Court's resolution of an issue on the merits
because the Court can heed the reasoning and results of the earlier decisions. But how
much percolation of a constitutional question is sufficient? Is any division of opinion
among lower court judges or circuits sufficient? Or is consensus among numerous
interpreters particularly valuable? And how do we assess whether multiple lower court
decisions improve the Court's decisionmaking?
Some would also argue that multiple decisions at lower levels are valuable because
they prepare the public for the Court's ruling on the issue. Judge Hatter's ruling and the
reaction of others to it could pave the way for the Supreme Court to accord constitutional
protection to gay and lesbian military service members, making the change in
constitutional law more palatable for some. Before the Supreme Court addresses the
issue, the responses of other constitutional actors may shed light on the polar views and
areas for compromise. Time for the press to give attention to litigants and their stories

311. In early post-election surveys, voters stated they were unhappy with Clinton's pursuit of the liberal agenda,
particularly his early emphasis on ending the ban to gays in the military, which detracted from attention to issues more
important to the average American voter, like economic initiatives. Novak, supranote 305.
312. Serving in Silence: The MargaretheCammermeyerStory (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 6, 1995).
313. This is a role the Court has sometimes proclaimed for itself, and one that scholars have both urged and rejected.
Compare Father,supranote 238 (discussing the impact of Supreme Court decisions on those not a party to the particular
case) with BICKEL, supranote 115, at 112-13 (claiming that "[t]here is no moral duty always and invariably to obey" a
judicial decision unless one is a party to the case).
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may make the public aware of the ban's effects on individuals and the military's
concerns. The Court could draw on Judge Hatter's reasoning, the differences among the
lower courts, and the public debate in its decision. Of course, several lower court rulings
favorable to gay and lesbian service members do not guarantee that the Court will
recognize a new area of constitutional protection, but it makes the job easier if the Court
is so inclined.
By focusing on deference, gradualism, and participation of multiple constitutional
actors, we may overlook or trivialize harms to litigants. Inconsistent, narrow rulings by
trial and appellate courts other than the Supreme Court promote uncertainty about federal
rights, both for service members and government organizations." 4 With the narrow
approach evidenced by the scope of the injunctions approved by the Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit in Meinhold, a series of lower courts could (and did) rule divergently on
constitutional challenges to the same policy. This is troubling because uniformity seems
particularly important in this context due to the federal, general nature of the military's
challenged policy.
Furthermore, an ongoing debate about the scope of constitutional protection for sexual
orientation comes at the expense of the gays and lesbians challenging the bans and others
similarly situated. If we assume that Judge Hatter "correctly" considered the ban
unconstitutional, rights would be more fully and quickly secured by a broad injunction
of national application. With the measured injunctive approach, each service member
subjected to an unconstitutional regulation must take the government to court, resulting
in delayfed clarification of rights, increased risk of inconsistent rulings, and significant
expense. The disruption to numerous litigants' military careers presents a compelling
argument that it is harmful not to enjoin the military's regulation more broadly. The
measured injunctive approach also results in duplicative litigation, which is inefficient
given the limited resources of the courts and government defendants.
Such an analysis assumes that Judge Hatter ruled "correctly" in securing individual
rights. The lower federal courts which interpret the Constitution differently do not rule
correctly; they allow unconstitutional conduct to continue. This analysis also assumes
that this harm can be characterized and resolved ex ante. I resolve these difficulties by
arguing that even if Judge Hatter was "wrong" (i.e., the ban will eventually be declared
constitutional by the Supreme Court), a balancing of harms calls for the protection of
individuals at the expense of government implementation of its policy while the ruling
is appealed. A primary function of the federal courts is to protect the rights of individuals
and nonmajorities from the prejudices of the majority. While the Supreme Court has not
yet ruled on the military's policy, this protective function to uphold federal rights
uniformly and speedily is vested in the lower federal courts. On the other hand, if the
District of Columbia court had ruled first-denying constitutional protection for gay and
lesbian service members-I would not give its refusal to issue an injunction nationwide,
binding effect. Because such a ruling would not protect individuals from majoritiarian

314. Yet, litigants must obey the rulings of lower courts-both state and federal-until an appellate court rules
otherwise. BURT, supranote 102, at 313-14 (discussing the Court's ruling in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967)). "In Walker, the Court invoked judicial supremacy to preserve social order without regard to the legitimacy of that
order, this was the clear implication of the Court's holding that even an unconstitutional judicial order must be obeyed."
Id. at 314.
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decisionmaking, the lower courts should consider other challenges until the Supreme
5
Court addresses the issue.'
Even if gradual change and a multiplicity of voices at other levels is valuable on some
constitutional questions, there is a need and justification for broader guidance and less
gradualism from the Supreme Court on this particular issue. One option is for the Court
to step in early to resolve the issue, as it did with the term limits case. 3 6 As noted earlier,
Justice Ginsburg has argued that it is' appropriate for the Court to "step ahead of the
political branches in pursuit of a constitutional precept" when majoritarian dialogue
cannot protect minority rights sufficiently?' 7 Arguably, the Clinton administration's
changing positions and eventual compromise on the ban demonstrate that the political
branches cannot effectively address this issue. However, strong disagreement exists about
the underlying rights for gay and lesbian service members and what level of
constitutional protection is required to protect individuals and groups from majoritarian
resolution in this context.
The military ban cases also demonstrate why the lower federal courts should sometimes
depart from the rule of measured steps. If Judge Hatter's broad constitutional ruling with
its broad injunctive relief had remained intact, other courts could follow that ruling until
the Supreme Court stepped in."' The danger is that no Supreme Court resolution is
guaranteed, or that resolution may not follow speedily. Thus, the first trial court to issue
an injunction on a constitutional challenge may have tremendous power. Lower courts
should depart only cautiously and infrequently from the rule because of these
ramifications. Because it is impractical for the Supreme Court to hear all cases presenting
inconsistent constitutional rulings, the lower courts will continue to bear most of this
responsibility. 3 9 To the extent that lower federal courts must perform some lawsaying
functions of the Supreme Court by default, the lower courts should adopt a flexible
approach to measured steps which emphasize their heightened role in providing guidance
and uniformity and departing from gradualism in certain substantive contexts.
It is impossible to evaluate potential detriments of the Meinhold model apart from the
merits of the constitutional right at stake. We cannot and should not separate the
procedural rule of measured steps from its substantive outcome in cases. In each context,
courts should inquire about the rule's effect, and in so doing, explicate their vision of the
federal courts' mission.

315. This asymmetrical approach is similar to offensive and defensive preclusion. Each litigant is entitled to one day
in court, but repeat players like the military can be bound by others' offensive use of preclusion in some circumstances.
See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 907-82 (2d ed. 1992).
316. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995); Greenhouse, supranote 262.
317. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1206.
318. This Article uses the broad scope of Judge Hatter's early injunction as an example of a departure from measured
steps by a trial court. It contrasts that departure with the narrow approach toward the scope of relief used by the Supreme
Court and the second Ninth Circuit ruling in Meinhold.This Article does not explore important collateral areas concerning
the scope of lower court rulings, including the rulings' precedential effects, preclusive effects, and aggregation
possibilities.

319. Chemerinsky & Kramer, supranote 209, at 84.
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CONCLUSION

The rule of measured steps should be applied with a case's context and substantive
constitutional issue in mind. 2 That is, for certain types of rights claims, avoidance may
advance a principle of gradualism, increase temporary deference, and encourage varied
participation in constitutional dialogue without undue costs. For other rights, measured
rulings which result in a lack of uniform, speedy protection of federal rights and lessened
judicial guidance are harmful.3 ' A flexible approach considers multiple factors within
a substantive context, and does not view the rule in its absolute form of never formulating
a constitutional ruling broader than the precise facts permit.
A flexible approach leaves courts with hard choices. Justice Scalia provides a good
starting point for discussion with his factors in Webster. His approach advocates that the
Supreme Court depart from the rule whenever "good cause" exists, emphasizing the
public guidance function of the Supreme Court. He directly links analysis of the factors
to the substantive constitutional context. Justice Stevens, in several references to the rule,
appears to advocate a "dispute resolution" model which would lead to fewer departures
from measured steps for the Court. Justice Ginsburg advocates measured steps generally,
but recognizes that the Court must sometimes depart from measured motions to protect
sufficiently nonmajoritarian concerns.
Courts should consider many variables in applying a flexible, context-dependent
approach to the rule of measured steps. Courts must be aware of the complexity of
characterizing a ruling as measured or broad. This Article offered several axes to gauge
measuredness, including the justifications for using measured steps offered by the
Supreme Court and the other varied aspects of measuredness. Although the Supreme
Court has in fact a flexible approach, the Justices frequently describe the rule as an
unquestionable rule of judicial restraint. But application of the rule is not mechanical and
should not be assumed. In employing or ignoring the rule of measured steps, the courts
make value choices about the substance of constitutional law. Courts should consider the
rule a collection of competing factors to be weighed within a substantive context. By
discussing their choices, courts will elucidate their vision of the appropriate role of the
courts in a dialogue about federal constitutional issues.
This Article examined the multiple factors of measuredness in evaluating the effects
of measured steps in two substantive contexts: a Supreme Court ruling on abortion
regulation and a series of lower federal court rulings concerning bans on gay and lesbian
service members. The examples demonstrate the difficulty of weighing the competing
factors. The advantages of measured steps have tradeoffs which some would classify as
disadvantages. For example, the promotion of deference in Webster appeared to generate
substantial public interest and response, invigorated pro-choice voters, and forced some
formerly neutral politicians to state their positions on abortion regulation. The majority
result also advanced a principle of gradualism: it slowed the pace of change, which

320. For example, some feminists and pragmatists prefer situativeness and contextual application of legal rules rather
than essentialist abstractions. See Margaret Jane Racin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1707
(1990).
321. See CHOPER, supranote 196; ELY, supranote 196; SUNSTEIN, supra note 25; see also Richard Davies Parker,
The Past ofConsiitulionalTheory-Andlits Future, 42 01O ST. LJ. 223 (1981) (calling for a constitutional theory which
focuses on substantive results as much as a fair process).
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afforded time for Justice Kennedy to alter his vote, Justice Souter to join the Court, and
a majority to preserve a core of Roe in Casey.
But that gradualism and deference was not without costs. The Court provided less clear
guidance, leaving the content of federal law ambiguous and less uniform. Justice Scalia
argued that the failure to directly overturn Roe by departing from the rule of measured
steps retained the status quo and did not recognize the power he viewed states as
possessing under the Constitution. Others who differ greatly from Scalia on the merits
of abortion rights could also reject a measured approach for the federal courts in that
context, arguing that the federal courts fail to protect meaningfully this fundamental right
when they are ambiguous, move gradually, and defer too extensively to other
constitutional actors. The ensuing "dialogue" is more like a cacophony which interferes
with the courts' securing important federal rights. Thus, weighing the costs and benefits
of gradualism and deference will depend on the substantive issue and ajurist's view of
the merits of that issue.
In my judgment, gradualism and respect for maximizing deference to other
decisionmakers are not appropriate when other decisionmakers will not allow full
participation in constitutional dialogue or have blocked access to the dialogue. Further,
the Supreme Court's unique role in providing guidance and promoting uniformity
justifies more frequent departures from the rule of measured steps by the Court.
Uniformity in federal law is best achieved if the Supreme Court addresses many
constitutional issues broadly but urges the lower federal courts and state courts to use
more measured steps in constitutional adjudication. The Court serves a symbolic
function, providing standards and recognizing areas of constitutional protection. Thus,
in some contexts, a broad statement (like the one in Roe) is important. In contrast, it is
generally more appropriate for lower federal courts, state courts, and other constitutional
actors to implement the Court's broad statements and standards, applying them to new
fact situations and responding in other ways to the Court's constitutional
pronouncements.
However, courts other than the Supreme Court should also use the same flexible,
context-dependent approach to depart from measured steps in some circumstances. If
Judge Hatter's broad injunctive relief had remained intact, other courts could follow that
ruling until the Supreme Court stepped in, either affirming or denying the constitutional
protection afforded by Judge Hatter. This is a close and difficult call because of the great
power a single trial court has under this approach. In determining whether to depart from
the rule, courts should ask whether uniform protection of a right is particularly important.
I argue that uniformity is important with the national military ban cases due to the general
nature of the government's regulation. Additionally, I conclude that the federal protection
of individuals and nonmajoritarian interests requires a broader, less gradual step. In
contexts where unanticipated problems are likely to develop, courts may want to proceed
more slowly. Courts should ask whether lower courts will benefit from broad rulings on
a given issue and how best to balance guidance with lower court discretion in the
implementation of a flexible standard.
This analysis of the rule of measured steps is grounded on my preference for increased
dialogue, both by the courts and other constitutional actors, and is intertwined with my
vision of the federal courts' role. The federal courts-particularly the Supreme
Court-have a duty to provide clear statements on constitutional law, promote uniformity
in the law, protect nonmajoritarian concerns, and make the Constitution meaningful over
time through a willingness to reassess the status quo. My application of the rule is also
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influenced by my substantive views in the two contexts discussed. Rather than rely
mechanically on avoidance, courts should use the rule of measured steps as a cautionary
admonition-as a reminder not to foreclose dialogue completely. As courts explicate their
applications of the rule, they will promote a sharing of the power and responsibility to
develop constitutional law. They will not encourage others to ignore this shared
responsibility or to believe incorrectly that the courts have foreclosed their ability to
respond. Multiple, long-term opportunities for participation exist as long as the Supreme
Court and other actors do not perceive that only the Court has the "last word" on a given
constitutional issue.

